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Scholars, philosophers, and theologians have debated the compatibility of 
Hellenic Philosophy with Islam since the eighth century CE.  In his book Averroes et 
l’Averroisme (1852), Ernst Renan identified Tahāfut al-Falsifa by al-Ghazali and Tahāfut 
al-Tahāfut by ibn Rushd as the two key texts resolving the issue: the Islamic world 
accepted al-Ghazali and fell into decline, while Europe accepted ibn Rushd (Averroës) 
and experienced the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Renan’s argument has endured 
among Arab liberal intellectuals over the past one-hundred sixty years, but using ibn 
Rushd as the mascot for Arab Rationalism has failed to inspire anything resembling a 
second Nahda.  Two contemporary Arab intellectuals, Mohammad ʿAbed al-Jabari and 
George Tarabichi, have engaged in their own dialogue about the works of al-Ghazali’s 
and ibn Rushd’s and whether or not Averroism can effect real change in the modern Arab 
world.  This paper examines the works of al-Ghazali, ibn Rushd, Renan, al-Jabari, and 
Tarabichi in their historical, cultural, and geographical contexts to conclude that the 
solution to the problems of the modern Arab world, if one exists, does not lie solely 
within the works of ibn Rushd.  
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Introduction: Standing on the Threshold 
“La exacta geografía de los hechos que voy a referir importa muy poco.”1 
   -Jorge Luis Borges, “El Hombre en el Umbral,” El Aleph, 1949 
 
For eight hundred years, there has been no lack of study or discussion about the 
writings, works, and ideology of ibn Rushd (520/1126 – 595/1198),2
 
known to medieval 
Europe as Averroës.  The precise geography of that discourse – not to mention the precise 
language or even the precise subject of that discourse – has varied widely.  Contrary to 
what Borges – a somewhat unreliable translator and writer who favored unreliable 
narrators3 – may or may not have us believe, however, the precise geography – and 
language, and subject – of the facts that I am about to relate truly does matter.  Given the 
vast corpus of academic, philosophical, scientific, and literary papers dedicated to 
analyzing ibn Rushd’s life, philosophy and contributions to Western and/or Islamic 
and/or  world civilization, attempting to understand even one facet of the man’s role in 
scholarly discourse (including dialectics, debates, and as often as not, ad hominem attacks 
and feuds) is an overwhelming task.  After all, over 20,000 pages of writing, including 
approximately sixty-seven original works and his voluminous commentaries on Aristotle 
and Plato, have been attributed to ibn Rushd, a genuine polymath. Philosophical 
commentary was technically a hobby he conducted during his spare time while also 
serving as the personal physician to Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr, the reigning Almohad 
Caliph during most of ibn Rushd’s life, and as the chief qadi in Seville and eventually 
Cordoba.4 
                                                 
1 “The precise geography of the facts that I am about to relate hardly matters.”  (translation is mine) 
2 Full name given by the Encyclopedia of Islam (2
nd
 Ed) as “Abu  l-Wal d Mu ammad b. A mad b. 
Mu ammad b. Rus h d, al- af dA mad b. Mu ammad b. Rus h d, al- af d Ibn Rus h d,” so as not to confuse 
him with his paternal grandfather nor his son, both of whom were also notable legal scholars and authors. 
3 Ian Almond, “Borges the Post-Orientalist: Images of Islam From the Edge of the West,” MSF - Modern 
Fiction Studies 50, no. 2 (2004): 435–459. pp 436. 
4 Roger Arnaldez, “Ibn Rus h d, Abu  ’l-Wal d Mu ammad B. A mad B. Mu ammad B. Rus h d, al- af d.,” 
ed. P. Bearman et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (Brill, 2011). 
 2 
Thanks to his enormous output and the chance preservation of most of his works, 
in Hebrew and Latin translations if not in the original Arabic, ibn Rushd was and remains 
a divisive but nonetheless important figure in history, religious studies/theology, 
philosophy, and, at times, politics.  Indeed, his influence and ideology appear to be more 
durable than St. Augustine. Although interest in ibn Rushd may fade in one corner of the 
globe or one field of study – or be banned by religious and philosophical opponents as 
pure heresy, as the climate of time and geography dictates – somehow, within a century 
or so, his works are once again invariably revived and proclaimed as relevant, modern, 
and forward-thinking in another place and time.  In this way, it can be said that ibn Rushd 
has attained the rare immortality and influence generally reserved for canonical religious 
texts, the magna opera of philosophers, and the occasional epic poet, novelist or 
playwright in the pantheon including Homer, Luo Guanzhong, and Shakespeare.  The 
very timelessness which grants these authors and their texts such remarkable endurance, 
however, also endows them with an inescapable weakness: such works can (and will) be 
quoted and interpreted by later writers in order to say and support almost any position.  
The content is, more often than not, never invoked quite so carefully or so forcefully as is 
the perceived authority which time has bequeathed upon the author and/or his works. 
This concept – that the figure of ibn Rushd the Philosopher is not nearly so 
important to modern Arabs as is the concept of ibn Rushd the Arab Rationalist – is 
growing to dominate the current Euro-centric/continental academic historical and 
political discourse regarding ibn Rushd, particularly in texts directed at English and 
German-speaking scholars.  This argument has been well-researched and supported in the 
works of German-speaking but English-writing authors including Anke von Kügelgen 
and Stefan Wild.5
 
 The position is certainly not without its merits and follows with the 
general post-structuralist axiom first formulated by Roland Barthes as “The Death of the 
                                                 
5 Stefan Wild, “Islamic Enlightenment and the Paradox of Averroes,” Die Welt Des Islams 36, no. 3, New 
Series (November 1996): 379–390; Anke von Kügelgen, Averroes Und Die Arabische Moderne: Ansätze 
Zu Einer Neubegründung Des Rationalismus Im Islam, Islamic Philosophy, Theology, and Science v. 19 
(Leiden [The Netherlands] ; New York: E.J. Brill, 1994); Anke von Kügelgen/ آنكى ڤون كوغيلغين, “A Call 
for Rationalism: ‘Arab Averroists’ in the Twentieth Century/ الرشديون العرب في القرن : دعوة للعقالنية
 .Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics, no. 16 (1996): 97–132 ”, العشرين
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Author.”  Even Mohammad ʿAbed al-Jabari,6 one of the most vehement contemporary 
Arab Averroists and one of the main subjects of this paper, admits that “the cognitive 
content of a philosophy, no matter which one, lives only once, then dies forever, without 
any hope of resuscitation… It is quite another thing for the ideological content of 
philosophy: it is in itself an ideology, and the time of ideology is a ‘possible-future,’ a 
future which ideology lives in the present… When the present expires, it eliminates itself 
to be born again in a new current present.”7
 
 In other words: it does not matter that ibn 
Rushd (and, as will be seen, his unwitting eternal opponent, al-Ghazali) lived and wrote 
in an Aristotelian universe governed and bounded by ‘scientific’ axioms that have long 
since been discarded through observations made possible by the development of superior 
tools. What matters is that when they approached that world, they sought to understand it 
using particular methods of observation, thought, and logical synthesis that remain 
relevant and competitive regardless of time or place. 
This returns us to Borges and to the question of whether the precise geography of 
these facts matters.  Though al-Jabari seems to answer that question with a hearty ‘no’ in 
the above quotation, even a cursory examination of his writings reveals that questions of 
geography are central to the underlying thesis of his magnum opus, the four-part Naqd al-
ʿAql al-ʿArabi (A Critique of Arab Reason8).  Twenty years of work and thousands of 
words written by al-Jabari can be fairly and simply condensed to a single sentence: ibn 
Rushd’s enduring ideology was the rejection of mashriqi (or Eastern) mysticism in favor 
of maghribi (Western) rationalism, and consequently, he believed that in order for the 
                                                 
 authorized this particular transliteration of his name on all works of his that (2010-1936) محمد عابد الجابري 6
were translated into English (or on which translation began) during his lifetime; in respect to him, that is 
how he will be referred to in this paper.  The legions of alternate transliterations used to refer to him in 
quotations and citations from secondary sources, however, will be left unaltered. The same holds for  جورج
 who publishes in French as George Tarabichi but is often referred to as “Tarabishi” in secondary , طرابيشي
sources. 
7 Mu ammad   bid Jābir , Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique, Middle East Monograph 
Series no. 12 (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1999), 122. 
8 “Reason” has variously been translated as “Thought” or “Mind,” but in the early stages of the 2011 
English, translation of the first volume, The Formation of Arab Reason, al-Jabari and his translator 
indicated a specific preference for translating ʿaql in this context as reason.  See the extensive footnote #1 
on page 31 of that text for their explanation. 
 4 
Arab world to compete and thrive in contemporary global society and economy, Arabs 
must follow this rationalist, Averroist, western ideal.  This argument is fundamentally 
geographical and while I hesitate to ascribe any particular ulterior motives to this thesis 
(as will be seen below, George Tarabichi is more than willing to do that for me), it should 
be noted that al-Jabari was a Moroccan (or, in Arabic, Maghribi) and associates Western 
Arab philosophers with the Western philosophical tradition.9 
This paper understands ‘geography’ as referring not only to a person, group, or 
event’s physical and temporal position, but also to position regarding exposure to certain 
texts, theories, and references, as may be determined not only by time and place, but also 
by personal academic field, background and language.  I used the term “facet” (of 
understanding) earlier, because during the course of my research I discovered 
contemporary discourses and dialectics regarding ibn Rushd and al-Ghazali taking place 
simultaneously in different languages and in different journals that appeared to exist in 
complete isolation from one another, with virtually no cross-citations between the 
discourses save for primary source documents and a few very old secondary sources.  For 
example, there is a lively dialectic on the relevance and compatibility of ibn Rushd’s 
ideology versus al-Ghazali’s in contemporary philosophy and science occurring in 
English-language journals and books, often published by Oxford or Stanford University 
Presses, but written by academics teaching and tenured within the geographic boundaries 
of Scandinavia and other Baltic-area nations.10  This entire corpus of work earned a 
                                                 
9 Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason : Text, Tradition and the Construction of 
Modernity in the Arab World (London: I.B.Tauris, 2011), 48. 
10 A selection of a few of the primary articles and texts in this dialogue, as well a demonstration of the 
variety of publications in which they appear, see: Taneli Kukkonen, “Plenitude, Possibility, and the Limits 
of Reason: A Medieval Arabic Debate on the Metaphysics of Nature,” Journal of the History of Ideas 61, 
no. 4 (October 1, 2000): 539–560; Taneli Kukkonen, “Averroes and the Teleological Argument,” Religious 
Studies 38, no. 4 (December 2002): 405–428; Ilai Alon, “Al-Ghazāl  on Causality,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 100, no. 4 (October 1, 1980): 397–405; Ruth Glasner, Averroes’ Physics: A 
Turning Point in Medieval Natural Philosophy (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Dag 
Nikolaus Hasse, “Influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2008., 2008, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/arabic-islamic-influence/;; Simo Knuuttila, Modalities in 
Medieval Philosophy, Topics in Medieval Philosophy (London ; New York: Routledge, 1993); Paul Oskar 
Kristeller, Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (Ed. di Storia e Letteratura, 1956). 
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single footnote within Ahmad Dallal’s Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History.11 
The near-complete rehabilitation of the theories and works of al-Ghazali that has taken 
place within the Scandinavian philosophical discourse is essentially unacknowledged by 
the aforementioned Anglo-American-Germanic contemporary history and political 
science discourse in which von Kügelgen, Wild, and Kassab, among many others, take 
part.  Meanwhile, Arab scholars who participate in the English-language discourse, 
including Fauzi M. Najjar, Mokdad Arfa Mensa, and S.M.A. Shahrestani appear to be 
biting their tongues at von Kugelgen’s and al-Jabari’s (somewhat paternalistic) argument 
regarding cognitive versus ideological content, as they argue for the relevance of many 
particulars of ibn Rushd’s works in modern Islamic society.12
 
  
It is at this point where it feels most relevant to note that, regardless of the 
discourse, the single constant is that Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (generally translated as The 
Incoherence of the Incoherence) is treated as ibn Rushd’s central and most important 
work.  According to Hans Wehr’s Arabic-English Dictionary, the term “tahāfut,” has 
shifted to mean “breakdown” and in particular, “nervous breakdown.”  Seen in this light, 
it should come as less of a surprise that the subject of ibn Rushd has caused such a 
confusion and a near-schizophrenic state of affairs amongst scholars across such a wide 
range of disciplines and locations. 
                                                 
11 Ahmad S Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History (New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University 
Press, 2010), 211.  Footnote number 44.   
Please note that Dr. Dallal is one of the more enterprising and cross-disciplinary scholars in this regard (his 
excellent bibliography mentions in passing nearly every contemporary discourse regarding ibn Rushd, but 
even he did not notice the largely Franco-phone discourse (save for a few papers by S. Montgomery Watt) 
on the influence that the political and religious climate that the Almohad court may have had ibn Rushd’s 
writings), which I only stumbled across accidentally after two years of research.   
Then there is the curious case of A.J. Wensinck (d. 1939), a French scholar and one of the editors of the 
First Edition of the Encyclopedia of Islam, who wrote a monograph on al-Ghazali’s thought, Pensée de 
Ghazali  (1933) that argued for al-Ghazali as both a Mutazlite and a neo-platonist.  A few positive reviews 
are published (some as late as 1948) and then the book disappears from ALL bibliographies until and is not 
cited again positively until 1991. See Madeleine Fletcher, “The Almohad Tawh d: Theology Which Relies 
on Logic,” Numen 38, no. 1 (June 1, 1991): 110–127.   
12 Fauzi M. Najjar, “Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and the Egyptian Enlightenment Movement,” British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 31, no. 2 (November 2004): 195–213; Averroës and the Enlightenment (Amherst, 
N.Y: Prometheus Books, 1996); “Averroës and the Rational Legacy in the East and the West,” Alif: 
Journal of Comparative Poetics, no. 16 (January 1, 1996). 
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So as to avoid yet another personal tahāfut brought on by the sheer overload of 
information, this paper confines itself to examining a pair of dialectics between two pairs 
of men, with a single intervening actor.  The first dialectic regards the compatibility of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, (or, at least, the Avicennan interpretation of it) with Islam, as 
seen in the works Tahāfut al-falsifa by Abū  āmid Mu ammad b. Mu ammad al- ūs  al-
G hazāl   (450/1058-505/1111) and the responding Tahāfut al-Tahāfut by ibn Rushd.  The 
intervening actor is Ernst Renan, whose work, Averroes et l’Averroisme (Averroës and 
Averroism) creates the dominant narrative explaining the supposed death of philosophy 
and rationalist thought in the Arab world.13  He states that the reason why Europe 
produced the Enlightenment and then proceeded to global dominance while the Islamic 
world went into a spiral of decline was because Europe embraced the works of ibn Rushd 
while the Islamic world chose al-Ghazali. This narrative establishes the hero and the 
villains of the story for the next century and half.  The second dialectic began in the early 
1980s as a discussion about the relevance of ibn Rushd’s ideology to the Arab world in 
the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War, the collapse of Nasserism and the rapid decline 
thereafter of Marxism between al-Jabari and Tarabichi. But the discourse later devolved 
into a number of ad hominem attacks regarding each other’s methods and ethical and 
moral integrity.  If these two dialectics (and the context of the intervening actor) are 
examined and understood in light of their precise geographies, then Renan’s simplistic 
and unproductive narrative collapses. The genuine underlying problematic – that the Arab 
world continues to struggle to become a competitive and productive member of the 
global social, political, commercial, and intellectual community – can then be approached 
through new and hopefully, much more productive theories and strategies. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Dimitri Gutas, “The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Essay on the 
Historiography of Arabic Philosophy,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 1 (May 2002): 6. 
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Chapter One: The Classical Philosophers and the First Dialectic 
All we have to believe with is our senses, the tools we use to perceive the world: 
our sight, our touch, our memory. If they lie to us, then nothing can be trusted. 
And even if we do not believe, then still we cannot travel in any other way than 
the road our senses show us; and we must walk that road to the end. 
 - Neil Gaiman, American Gods, 2001
AL-GHAZALI: CONFLICT AND TRANSIT BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT 
Thanks to the influence of the many articles and books that link al-Ghazali and 
ibn Rushd’s careers together so intimately and consistently, it is easily forgotten that al-
Ghazali died fifteen years before ibn Rushd was born and that it is generally accepted that  
they never set foot on the same continent as each other.  Al-Ghazali was born in 
Khurasan, on the Eastern side of the Abbasid Empire, and never traveled further West 
than Mecca.14  Depicted by so many post-Renan narratives (and, at times, by ibn Rushd 
himself) as the uncontested and acclaimed father and spokesman of Ashʿarite Sunni 
orthodoxy, a brief overview of al-Ghazali’s biography reveals a man who was one voice 
amongst a clamorous din, and whose opinions regarding Hellenic philosophy, 
demonstrable science, and the growing prominence of kalam agreed with ibn Rushd’s as 
often as they did with those of his contemporary Ashʿarite scholars. That al-Ghazali 
achieved any lasting prominence at all is a testament to his brilliance and his prolific 
work, but also probably owed a great deal to pure luck.   
Part of the reason that al-Ghazali’s biography and career is less documented than 
ibn Rushd’s (and that so much of his bibliography is either lost or of contested-
attribution) stems from the fact that al-Ghazali lived, wrote, and taught in heart of the 
Abbasid Empire during an era wherein the balance of power in that empire was in a 
constant state of flux.  Also, unlike ibn Rushd, for parts of his life al-Ghazali traveled 
constantly, teaching in Baghdad, Damascus, and Mecca/Medina among other places. His 
departures were motivated by threats to his career and/or life as shifts in power put him in 
favor or disfavor in one region or another, by his personal dissatisfaction with the 
                                                 
14 W. Montgomery Watt, “al-G H azāl , Abū  āmid Mu ammad B. Mu ammad al- ūs ,” ed. P. Bearman et 
al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (Brill, 2011). 
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philosophical and theological positions of his youth, by and apparent nervous breakdown, 
and by invitations to return to Baghdad as he came back to favor at court despite a twelve 
year absence.   
During al-Ghazali’s lifetime, the Sunni Abbasid Empire faced challenges both 
internal and external: Shi’i Zaydis threatened the empire on two fronts, from Khurasan as 
well as Yemen on the peninsula, where Kharajites continued to rebel against Abbasid 
legitimacy.  Since the early tenth century and throughout the eleventh, the North African 
Fatimid Ismaili Caliphate rivaled the Abbasids, holding Egypt and the Levant and 
threatening Abbasid control over the Hijaz.  Meanwhile, within Baghdad, the caliphate 
retained some nominal political power, but the vast majority of it had been transferred to 
the position of the sultanate, held at that time by the Turkish Seljukids. This transfer in 
political power at the highest levels of the Abbasid Empire mirrored a transition in 
theological and philosophical power.  Whereas the early Abbasids had largely embraced 
and encouraged Mutazalite15  jurists and scholars, by the middle of the eleventh century 
CE Ashʿarite ʿulama and their madhahib would cement their position as the backbone of 
Sunni orthodoxy.  Al-Ghazali, an orphan educated by Shafi’i instructors and whose main 
patron at court was a paternal uncle held in esteem by the caliphate but not the sultanate, 
made his own name and gained power and position through his own merits and 
maneuverings.   While he was politically and, in some ways, theologically flexible and 
pragmatic, al-Ghazali’s firm and outspoken positions on particular issues, especially his 
criticism not only of Mutazlites but also of the Maliki madhab, as well as his increasing 
advocacy for Sufism as he grew older made him a controversial figure throughout his 
life. The following biography is based on the least contested records of al-Ghazali’s life 
and provides a context for the conditions under which he wrote Tahafut al-Falsifa.  
                                                 
15 A term loosely used to unite scholars in the classical period who placed more emphasis on ijtihad and 
qiyas as well as knowledge obtained from Hellenic philosophy (It is derived from a root that means to set 
apart, isolate, or separate).  It is unclear whether this was their name by choice or a derisive epithet).  
Compare to the “Ashʿarites” (named for al-Ashʿari (260/873 – 324/935), Sunni thinkers who emphasized 
the importance of the hadith and traditionalism, and many of whom considered any jahiliyya texts suspect 
at best and heresy at worst.   
 9 
As stated earlier, al-Ghazali was an orphan with few connections; as such, the 
majority of his early teachers were obscure figures or scholars of little note with the 
exception of al-Juwainy, who appears to have been a rather combative Ash‘arite from the 
Shafi’i madhab. He familiarized himself and his students with Mutazalite theories and 
methods in order to better refute them—or support them.16  By the time al-Ghazali came 
of age, the Ashʿarite madhabhib, particularly Hanbali and the slightly more liberal 
Shafi’i, had gained a great deal of influence within the empire and were on the cusp of 
being declared the official Sunni orthodoxy.17  From what little is known of al-Ghazali’s 
first instructors, it appears that his early studies included some kalam and legal training, 
most likely from the tradition of the Shafi’i madhab, though there is evidence that he was 
exposed to and may have, in part agreed with some of the methods and theories of the 
Hanbali schools.18  His harsh criticism of the Maliki madhab gained him the admiration 
ibn-Tumart, the spiritual leader of the Almohad movement which displaced the Maliki 
Almoravid dynasty in al-Andalus during ibn Rushd’s lifetime, quite possibly inspiring the 
conditions that enabled ibn Rushd’s career.19   
Judging by the texts he frequently cites in his writings on philosophy, al-Ghazali’s 
diverse curriculum included reading the commentaries on Aristotle by the early Muslim 
neo-platonists and Mutazlite scholars including ibn Sina (Avicenna) and al-Farabi as well 
as works by more conservative mutakallimun, but did not include the original translations 
of Aristotle only the commentaries. Many of ibn Rushd’s most direct criticisms of al-
Ghazali stem from allegations that he quoted only Arab commentators on Aristotle, not 
                                                 
16 God’s Rule: Government and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought, New ed., New 
Edinburgh Islamic Surveys (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 223, 234; W. Montgomery 
Watt, “al-G H azāl , Abū  āmid Mu ammad B. Mu ammad al- ūs "; Mu ammad   bid Jābir , Arab-
Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique (Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of 
Texas at Austin, 1999), 43.  Note that al-Jabari’s statement that “Juwayni, the most prominent Ash arite 
theologian of his time” contradict’s Crone’s assertion that al-Juwayni often agreed with Mut azlite 
positions against Ash arites ones, albeit using different methods. 
17 Duncan B. MacDonald, “The Life of al-Ghazzāl , with Especial Reference to His Religious Experiences 
and Opinions,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 20 (January 1, 1899): 71–132. pp 92; Albert 
Habib Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (London: Faber, 2002). pp166. 
18 Richard M. Frank, Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʻarite School (Duke University Press, 1994). pp 4-6. 
19 Roger Arnaldez, Averroes: A Rationalist in Islam (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 
2000). pp 6. 
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the works of Aristotle himself.20  But al-Ghazali’s criticism of ibn Sina and other 
Mutazalites, in addition to the theology of certain Kharajite and Zaydi sects show that he 
was highly literate and well-informed in both their theories and their writings.21     
Al-Ghazali must have shown an early aptitude for his studies as following the 
death of Juwainy in 478/1085 he gained admission to a special academy in Baghdad set 
up by the vizier Nizam al-Mulk. Possibly the most influential power-broker of his time, 
al-Mulk acted as a sort of mediator between the sultanate and the caliphate though in 
general he actively assisted in shifting power into the sultanate.22  Al-Ghazali 
distinguished himself from his peers well enough to be appointed as the chief professor of 
a madrasa endowed by Nizam al-Mulk in Baghdad.  During his tenure there, he wrote a 
number of legal treatises, most of which have since been lost, as well as his defense of 
Hellenic philosophical methods, Maqasid al-Falsifa. He also began work on Tahafut at 
this time.23  That al-Ghazali felt comfortable enough to deal with and, in part, defend 
works increasingly condemned by fellow Sunni ‘ulama as pure heresy indicates the 
security of his position both professionally and politically during this period of his life. 
The lost legal works, judging by their titles, may have extended his project of 
encouraging jurists and scholars in his Shafi’i madhab towards a methodology influenced 
more by Hellenic-inspired logic than by the scholars’ Hanbali and Maliki rivals, as he 
expressed in al-Iḳtiṣād fi 'l-iʿtiḳād.24  The absence of any notable writings on Sufism 
                                                 
20 Ibid. pp 98. 
21 Averroës, The Attitude of Islam Towards Science and Philosophy: A Translation of Ibn Rushd’s 
(Averroës) Famous Treatise Faslul-Al-Maqal, 1st ed. (New Delhi: Sarup, 2003). pp 44-45.  Please note that 
this comes from the preface “Al-Ghazzali and Ibn Rushd – Conflict and Concord,” written by Dr. 
Rafiabiadi.  While this text will be referred to throughout this paper, the first section, a biography of ibn 
Rushd contributed by Rafiabadi’s co-author/translator Dr. Aadil Amin Kak appears to have plagiarized, 
without any form of attribution whatsoever, Roger Arnaldez’s 1985 Encyclopedia of Islam (2
nd
 Edition) 
article on ibn Rushd (compare especially pages 9-12).  As such, most citations to this book will come from 
Dr. Rafiabadi’s section, as he provided in text citation for his sources and thus appears a more reliable and 
ethical scholar than his collaborator. 
22 Watt, “al-G H azāl , Abū  āmid Mu ammad B. Mu ammad al- ūs .” 
23 George F. Hourani, “A Revised Chronology of Ghazāl ’s Writings,” Journal of the American Oriental 
Society 104, no. 2 (April 1, 1984): 289–302. pp 292. 
24 Watt, “al-G H azāl , Abū  āmid Mu ammad B. Mu ammad al- ūs ”; Ahmad Dallal, “Ghazali and the 
Perils of Interpretation,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 122, no. 4 (October 1, 2002): 773–787; 
Hourani, “A Revised Chronology of Ghazāl ’s Writings,” 291. 
 11 
could stem from a need to avoid further controversy and criticism, but it is more likely 
that he did not yet consider himself capable of writing on the subject with any real 
authority.  
Al-Ghazali’s criticism in his legal works of those ‘ulama and jurists who he 
believed had fallen into taqlid, or thoughtless imitation of tradition attracted some 
negative attention, but his political mis-steps in the negotiation of power between the 
caliphate and the sultanate, would cause al-Ghazali the most grief.  The death of his 
patron and ally al-Mulk in 1092 cut off al-Ghazali’s main source of support from the 
sultanate rather than with the caliphate.  An additional threat to al-Ghazali’s position 
came from the probable assassination of al-Ghazali’s uncle, his last remaining connection 
to the caliphate, by partisans of the sultanate in 1095.  Perhaps in response to the 
assassination, al-Ghazali began al-Mustazhiri, in which he argues strongly for the secular 
power of the Turks while maintaining his allegiance to the Abbasids as the true spiritual 
leaders of the Sunnis, much like the various Shi'i imams extant at that time.25 
Coincidentally, this made al-Ghazali one of the first Ashʿari intellectuals to imply not 
only that ‘separation of church and state’ within Islam was possible, but also that it 
already existed.   
The stress of political instability as well as a crisis of conscience in his 
philosophical affiliation may have prompted an apparent nervous breakdown in 1095. Al-
Ghazali chose to leave his position in Baghdad as well as his family and took an extended 
two year pilgrimage and retreat to Mecca and then Medina.26  Few reliable accounts of 
these years exist, but judging by his writings, al-Ghazali became increasingly 
disillusioned with the ‘sciences’ of fiqh, tafsir, and kalam.27  His brief experimentation 
with Philosophical Skepticism are usually connected with these two years.  After he left 
                                                 
25 Hourani, “A Revised Chronology of Ghazāl ’s Writings.” pp 298. Crone, God’s Rule: Government and 
Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought; Carole Hillenbrand, “Islamic Orthodoxy or 
Realpolitik? Al-Ghazāl ’s Views on Government,” Iran 26 (January 1, 1988): 82. pp 237, 248. 
26 Watt, “al-G H azāl , Abū  āmid Mu ammad B. Mu ammad al- ūs ”; Crone, God’s Rule: Government 
and Islam: Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought. 
27 Dallal provides the most pithy but umbrella-like definitions of these terms, as ‘jurisprudence,’ ‘Qur’anic 
exegesis’ and ‘speculative theology’ respectively; see Islam, 116-117 
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the Hijaz in 1096 he entered into a ten year period as a reclusive vagabond in the Levant.  
Reports that he may have at one point travelled to and taught in Egypt or Cairo were 
contested and have not been given credit in the last century.28   
While the records become even less reliable, there are a few touchstones 
available.  Al-Ghazali himself states that he began Ihya’ʿalum al-Din, his decisive and 
severe critique of the trajectory of thought and ideology among mutakallimun and within 
Sunni madhahib at that time while in Jerusalem.  His critique used as its methodology 
pure Aristotelian logic.29  According to Arnaldez, al-Ghazali singled out the Maliki 
school for his harshest attacks against its then-recent habit of issuing manuals of 
judgment, the Muwatta, which he considered to be the worst form of taqlid.   This led to 
his work being declared heretical and selected for burning by Almoravid Maliki ‘ulama.30  
This portion of al-Ghazali’s life, from 1096 until 1105, is likewise poorly documented, 
partially due to his withdrawal from society while he gained personal experience as an 
ascetic and mystic. He claims to have written at least five books in the interim and he 
may have lectured privately in Damascus,.31 What had begun as a flight from political 
persecution but had turned into a kind of self-imposed exile. 
Al-Ghazali reappeared in history in 1105 after the Seljukid vizier invited al-
Ghazali to return and teach in Baghdad, where he remained until his death in 1111. Al-
Ghazali taught only reluctantly and may have accepted the invitation only in the hope of 
spreading a higher truth he had found in Sufi mysticism.32  His non-commissioned 
                                                 
28 Watt, “al-G H azāl , Abū  āmid Mu ammad B. Mu ammad al- ūs .” 
29 Hourani, “A Revised Chronology of Ghazāl ’s Writings,” 296.  The completion date, however, is much 
more difficult to place – it was finished at the latest in 1105. 
30 Watt, “al-G H azāl , Abū  āmid Mu ammad B. Mu ammad al- ūs ”; Hourani, “A Revised Chronology 
of Ghazāl ’s Writings”; Arnaldez, Averroes; Alternatively, “The Almohad Tawh d,” 116–117Dominique 
Urvoy has al-Ghazali switching allegiances at least three times in her book: as a founding ideologue, the 
antithesis of, and as ibn Tumart's greatest inspiration, Ibn Rushd, Averroes, Arabic Thought and Culture 
(London ; New York: Routledge, 1991), 26, 74, 83.  This apparent schizophrenia of opinions led me to 
label this as a source of suspect reliability which is cited only when; it is included here as an example of the 
way that al-Ghazali is often condemned as an enemy of rationalism, despite the content of his writings. 
31 Howard Kasimow, “The Harmony of Mysticism and Rationalism in the Religious Philosophy of Abu 
Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali,” Mystics Quarterly 18, no. 4 (December 1, 1992): 117; Hourani, “A 
Revised Chronology of Ghazāl ’s Writings,” 297. 
32 Watt, “al-G H azāl , Abū  āmid Mu ammad B. Mu ammad al- ūs .” 
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writings following his return to Baghdad focus increasingly on Sufism.33  Numerous 
reports from early biographers of ibn Tumart, the spiritual founder of the Almohad 
movement and dynasty, that al-Ghazali met ibn Tumart at some point during this period 
to report the burning of Ihya’ʿalum al-Din, upon which he received al-Ghazali’s 
endorsement to conquer the Almoravids  are almost certainly apocryphal.34 But it is not 
the elder, mystic al-Ghazali with whom ibn Rushd takes issue (Ernst Renan and al-Jabari 
will do that service), but rather the youthful al-Ghazali who had attempted to reconcile 
Hellenic philosophy with Islam as best he could. 
 In short, the career and writings of al-Ghazali reflect the evolving views and 
opinions of a man who faced intense political pressures and an extended period of mental 
instability, philosophical despair, and poverty, but also a man of remarkable literacy, 
even for his time.  Contemporary inquiries into al-Ghazali’s seek to understand an 
ideology that defies the Orientalist taxonomy of the Classical period: unlike many 
Ashʿarites al-Ghazali tended to discount the hadith in favor of rationalism, but unlike the 
Mutazalites, he considered the Qur’an an authoritative source of all knowledge.35  It is 
difficult to justify the frequent characterization of al-Ghazali as an enemy of scientific 
inquiry who sought to eliminate rationalism by declaring it a sign of disbelief: if anything 
he condemned kalam more harshly than falsifa.  
IBN RUSHD: A MORE FOCUSED NARRATIVE 
As remarked above, ibn Rushd’s life and works are remarkably well-documented, 
especially in contrast to al-Ghazali.  This may be the result of Ernst Renan’s intense 
interest in ibn Rushd—he is credited with piecing together the essentials of biography 
                                                 
33 Taneli Kukkonen, “Plenitude, Possibility, and the Limits of Reason: A Medieval Arabic Debate on the 
Metaphysics of Nature,” Journal of the History of Ideas 61, no. 4 (October 1, 2000): 560. pp 6. 
34 JFP Hopkins, “Ibn Tūmart,” ed. P. Bearman et al., Encyclopaedia of Islam (Brill, 2011). Hopkins states 
that this is true because by 1106, al-Ghazali had left Baghdad and retired to Khurasan, which is 
contradicted by Arnaldez.  However, given that Hourani states that Ihya was completed in 1105, the 
likelihood of it being transmitted to al-Andalus, declared heretical, and burned before Tumart left Spain in 
1107 is small.  
35 Fletcher, “The Almohad Tawh d,” Numen, 38:1, 110-127: 116–117.  Fletcher declares al-Ghazali a 
Mutazalite 
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still used by scholars today.36 Alternatively, the difference stems from the fact that ibn 
Rushd’s life and career follow a much more linear trajectory.  Ibn Rushd was born into 
privilege and maintained the favor of his caliph throughout his life until only three years 
before his death.  Ibn Rushd’s exile would have been blip in his biography—the Caliph 
Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb al-Manṣūr rescinded it in 1098—but unfortunately ibn Rushd died 
before he could return to court.  His comparative position of privilege and security 
allowed him to produce the massive corpus of writings mentioned in the introduction; the 
consistency in his life allows me to provide much less biographical context for his 
writings: in general, life was good.   
While ibn Rushd enjoyed more privileges and faced fewer political obstacles to 
his completing his work than al-Ghazali, ibn Rushd lived in al-Andalus and al-Maghreb, 
distant from separated from the Sunni intellectual and philosophical discourse going on in 
the Levant and the heartlands of the Abbasid empire and lacked the access that al-Ghazali 
had to contemporary texts. Ibn Rushd bemoaned his scholarly isolation and noted that 
many more Ash‘arite texts found their way to Spain than did Mutazalites. Those texts 
that he did read led him to believe that Mutazalites and Ash‘arites used similar 
methods.37 This odd conclusion can be explained by the fact that the vast majority of the 
Eastern texts that ibn Rushd cited (and, thus we can be confident of his familiarity) were 
written by al-Ghazali, warping ibn Rushd’s perception of Ash‘ari methodology.   
As stated in the introduction, ibn Rushd was an advocative philosopher.  He came 
from a well-respected and prominent family. Both his father and his grandfather had 
served as Maliki qadis, albeit relatively liberal ones.38 His grandfather (d. 1126) had also 
acted as the imam at the Great Mosque of Cordoba, a position that gave rise to one of 
ibn-Rushd’s epithets is “The Grandson”.  Though the Almoravid-Almohad transition 
(1146) occurred during ibn Rushd’s lifetime, his family suffered no apparent persecution 
for their previous legal, political, and religious alliances.   
                                                 
36 Wild, “Islamic Enlightenment and the Paradox of Averroes,” 383. 
37 Averroës, The Attitude of Islam Towards Science and Philosophy, 45. 
38 Arnaldez, Averroes, 8. 
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Records of ibn Rushd’s early education indicate that he had also intended to focus 
on law, and he excelled in his studies, which included Maliki kalam and memorization of 
the Muwatta.39  All evidence shows that he followed his grandfather and father into the 
Maliki madhab (and would also eventually serve as the chief imam of the Great Mosque 
of Cordoba).40   For reasons unknown, ibn Rush began to study medicine under Abū 
 j aʿfarHārūn al-Tad j āl   (possibly his education with al-Tadjali began because he was 
considered an expert at hadith transmission as well).  It was through his studies of 
medicine, most likely via Galen, that ibn Rushd encountered and began to study Hellenic 
philosophy.  As his tutor was also closely connected to al-‘Arabi, the man who brought 
Tahafut al-Tahafut to Spain, this may have been the time when ibn Rushd first 
encountered al-Ghazali.   
All of this occurred before ibn Rushd was twenty-seven years old.  We know this 
because by 1153, a mere seven years after the Almohad conquest of Spain, ibn Rushd 
was helping to found schools in Marrakesh under the patronage of the new caliph. He 
was also making astronomical observations and beginning to write his first 
commentaries.  During his travels and studies in North Africa (there is no evidence he 
ever made a hajj or traveled so far East as then-Fatimid Egypt), he gained the favor of 
two of the most important figures in his life: ibn Tufayl, and the Almohad Crown Prince, 
Abū Yaʿḳūb Yūsuf.  All three held similar views regarding Hellenic philosophy 
(following the death of ibn Tumart, the royal family grew distant from the Almohad 
religious movement), and felt that it should become part of the general curriculum for the 
educated. Soon after, the Crown Prince requested that ibn-Tufayl, his personal physician, 
amend and correct the existing translations of Aristotle.  Ibn-Tufayl, who believed 
himself too old to complete such an ambitious project, delegated the work to ibn Rushd, 
lending some professional legitimacy to ibn Rushd’s commentary hobby.41 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 9. 
40 Ibid., 10. 
41 Arnaldez, “Ibn Rus h d, Abu  ’l-Wal d Mu ammad B. A mad B. Mu ammad B. Rus h d, al- af d.”;  
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Ibn Rushd’s life proceeded without any notable obstacles to his writing. After 
completing a number of short commentaries of Aristotle in the course of his translations, 
ibn Rushd’s interest shifted towards composing original texts which he felt would 
reconcile Aristotle’s teachings with the infallibility of the Qur’an.  From 1174 to 1180 he 
wrote five books on the subject, including the notorious Tahafut al-Tahafut as well as the 
Fasl al-Maqal which almost reads as an apology to al-Ghazali for the earlier work; he 
makes sure to praise al-Ghazali by name for his dedication to Sufi asceticism and for 
sharing the opinion with ibn Rushd that access to Gnostic and dialectic interpretations of 
the Qur’an and philosophical texts should be restricted to people with the capability to 
understand them. The educated should only share with the general public those 
interpretations that can be physically demonstrated (burhan) to the common man.42  In 
looking at those sections directly addressed to al-Ghazali, it becomes clear that ibn 
Tufayl, while a great influence on ibn Rushd, did not believe the notion that al-Ghazali 
and other ‘Eastern’ philosophers were influenced by a secret mashriq mysticism.43  
Ibn Rushd wrote these books under the protection of a succession of Almohad 
caliphs willing to shelter him from his critics, namely the other Maliki jurists as well as 
the remaining Almohad zealots.  But in 1195, facing a growing threat from Spanish 
Christians and seeking the support of those groups, Caliph al-Mansur caved to pressure 
and stripped ibn Rushd of his titles before ordering him into exile—all the way to 
Lucena, a small town just south of Cordoba.  It was by his own choice that ibn Rushd fled 
all the way to Marrakesh.  Al-Mansur also permitted the Maliki and Almohad critics to 
burn copies of ibn Rushd’s works as anathema.44  In this case, however, ibn Rushd could 
thank the few Almohad principles that the royal family had embraced: persecution of 
religious minorities.  A steady migration of Andalusians to Egypt had carried with them 
copies of ibn Rushd’s work, helping to preserve it during this brief and quickly reversed 
                                                 
42 Averroës, The Attitude of Islam Towards Science and Philosophy, 160–164. 
43 Gutas, “The Study of Arabic Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,” 7. 
44 Urvoy, Ibn Rushd, Averroes, 34/35. 
 17 
persecution.  Had ibn Rushd not traveled so far, he might have resumed his position as 
chief Qadi.   
The case of ibn Rushd offers one possibility for the supposed ‘end of rationalism’ 
within the Islamic world, even if the said ‘end’ did not coincide with his death.45  
Philosophers in the Arab world who rejected religious funding relied on royal and other 
wealthy patrons to allow them to do their work, much like philosophers in every other 
culture.  Religious leaders tend to accept a far more populist worldview and hence are 
able to motivate large groups of people when necessary.  While the Ash‘arites solidified 
their position as the orthodoxy of Sunni Islam, the mutakallimun and their institutions 
also benefited from the funding derived from various awqaf that had been granted to 
them in perpetuity as signs of piety—al-Azhar comes to mind as a prime example.  














                                                 
45 As al-Jabari wrote his doctoral thesis on ibn Khaldun (732/1332 – 808/1406), it seems odd that he 
embraces Renan’s date of 1198 to mark the end point of Arab rationalism and philosophy. 
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Chapter Two: Tahāfut al-Falsifa versus Tahāfut al-Tahāfut 
L
? 
-Death to the Philosopher, Sir Terry Pratchett, “Death and What Comes Next,” 2004  
 
Comparing the views of al-Ghazali and ibn Rushd on Aristotelian logic as it was 
understood by earlier and their contemporary Arab commentators is made remarkably 
simple as ibn Rushd’s quotes al-Ghazali’s text nearly line for line before inserting his 
counter arguments. Amusingly enough, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has 
been accused of being nothing more than a plagiarization of both books.46  But perhaps 
these accusations are worthy of more serious consideration: if both Tahāfuts are 
composed of content which has been interpreted as the direct progenitor of Kant’s 
Critique— one of the fundamental texts of modern Western philosophy, written by the 
man who defined Enlightenment—how is it possible to support a narrative which accuses 
al-Ghazali’s text of destroying any chance the Arab world had of experiencing an 
Enlightenment of their own? 
Al-Ghazali wrote his pair of treatises dealing with al-Falsifa—first Maqasid, then 
Tahāfut, between 1091 and early 1095.47  He admitted to spending nearly as much, if not 
more, time contemplating the subjects than he did writing about them.  This 
contemplative period coincides with the end of his early, secure career as a student, jurist 
and teacher in Baghdad.  While al-Ghazali was defending Aristotelian demonstrative and 
empirical methods, al-Ghazali’s patron and protector at court was assassinated; as he 
finished critiquing Aristotle’s Metaphysics, another assassination took away his 
remaining defender.  Finishing Tahāfut may have coincided with the alleged nervous 
breakdown that caused him to resign his positions, abandon his family, and embark on a 
                                                 
46 Kukkonen, “Averroes and the Teleological Argument,” 422–424.  Paul Edwards (1973), The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, MacMillan Publishing Company, Volume 3-4, p. 327 
47 Hourani, “A Revised Chronology of Ghazāl ’s Writings,” 292–293. 
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twelve year career as a mendicant and ascetic.48  Al-Ghazali’s rapidly deteriorating 
personal and professional life in this period do not appear to have had any particular 
effect on his writing, but it should be noted that he had not read Aristotle, only his 
commentators.  While ibn Sina and others wrote their commentaries in Arabic, they were 
working from the early Arabic translations of Aristotle deemed so inadequate and 
inaccurate by Ibn Rushd in the twelfth century. 
While reading the Tahafuts, there was one particular word which I read along 
with the modern translations in order to know how it had been translated from Greek to 
Arabic: the phrase τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ βιβλία, which was quickly Latinized and reduced to 
a single word, μετὰφυσικὰ, or Metaphysics. The English word is the result of one of the 
finest examples of mistranslation, mistransliteration, and a posteriori definitions created 
to justify the error.49  Most modern Arabic texts referring to the subject use a straight 
transliteration of the Latinized term.  However, as the first Arab and Syriac translations 
were taken from the original Greek, they were slightly more successful: the first (lost) 
translation of the text by al-Kindi was catalogued as Kitāb fī al-Falsafa al-ūlā “Book on 
First Philosophy”.50  This early correction by way of translation, however, apparently did 
not continue to the body of the texts or the commentary about them.  Both al-Ghazali and 
ibn Rushd use the translation “‘alūm al-’ihilliyya” to refer to metaphysics, which would 
be slightly less problematic if ’ihilliyya did not derive from the same root as God/god and 
thereby encouraging unconscious associations (similar to the English mistranslation) 
                                                 
48 Once again, the modern meaning of Tahafut makes an appearance in the Classical period – leading me to 
wonder if there is some eldritch, madness-inducing alien geometry inherent in the word. 
49 S. Marc Cohen, “Aristotleś Metaphysics,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, Spring 2009., 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/.  
Aristotle himself referred to the subject now termed metaphysics as First Philosophy. When Aristotle’s 
works were finally collected, catalogued, and edited together, the editor, (most likely Andronicus of 
Rhodes), took the essays referring to or vaguely related to the First Philosophy and bound them together in 
a volume that was then entered into the catalogue. It just so happened to be the final volume in the 
collection and Andronicus, failing to note a unifying subject for all of the writings, gave up and named the 
collection by its position in his catalogue: τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ βιβλία, or “The books that come after the 
books on Physics." Retroactive definitions began to appear almost immediately, generally referring to these 
being a higher form of knowledge, or to the fact that μετὰφυσικὰ can also be translated as “supernatural” 
50 Amos Bertolacci, “On The Arabic Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics,” Arabic Sciences and 
Philosophy 15 (2005): 257. 
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because the term actually translates closer to ‘theology’ than the Arabic term kalam.  This 
association definitely appears to influence some of al-Ghazali’s arguments and possibly 
his decision to assert that people holding three particular beliefs were kafirun. 
With those handicaps in mind, Tahafut al-Tahafut is a relatively simple read when 
compared to its peers on the subject of metaphysics.  Al-Ghazali’s attraction to 
Skepticism is evident in his preference for using demonstrable (i.e. empirical) 
explanations when possible, and helps him avoid Spinozan explorations into the 
definition of the being of substance.  Sadly, the same cannot be said of ibn Rushd, whose 
responses get rather dense, circular, and repetitive – while both of them include 
information from earlier chapters in later arguments, al-Ghazali is much better at 
reminding the reader exactly when this information had been introduces.  While al-
Ghazali’s tone tends to be pedantic – he was working as a professor throughout the 
period – his close adherence to a clearly laid-out structure and organization helps even 
the most distractible reader to follow through his arguments.    
Al-Ghazali states outright that he is not criticizing mathematics, geometry, logic, 
or any of the physical sciences, and that seventeen of his twenty problems are simply 
examples of the philosophers (presumably al-Kindi, ibn Sina, and other early neo-
Platonists) being internally inconsistent according to Aristotelian logic or adopting 
positions which they cannot prove but which are in defiance of the Qur’anic position on 
that question.51  Nonetheless, ibn Rushd seems to take every objection as a personal 
affront, responding to an early remark by stating, “All this is the work of one who does 
not understand the exalted natures of the heavenly bodies and their acts of wisdom for the 
sake of which they have been created, and who compares God’s knowledge with the 
knowledge of ignorant man.”52   
                                                 
51 al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifa, trans. Sabih Ahmad Kamali (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 
1963), 1–6. 
52 ibn Rushd, “Tahafut al-Tahafut,” trans. Simon Van Den Bergh, Http://www.muslimphilosophy.com, 
1978, sec. First Discussion, Concerning the Eternity of the World, First Proof, 
http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ir/tt/. 
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This sort of name calling does not originate from al-Ghazali’s text, and he singles 
out only three Hellenic philosophical positions as inherently heretical: 
 the problem of the eternity of the world, where they maintained that all the 
substances are eternal 
 their assertion that Divine knowledge does not encompass individual 
objects. 
 their denial of the resurrection of bodies53 
 
While interesting thought exercises, none of these disagreements are particularly 
important questions in terms of inspiring a Scientific Enlightenment.  Thus, al-Ghazali is 
not, as sometimes depicted, a religious zealot threatening any aspiring scientists with 
damnation.   
The critics’ usual retort would be that, in section seventeen, al-Ghazali does deny 
the absolute rule of cause and effect.  The selection from his explanation most frequently 
cited (without context) is reproduced below in full: 
viz., the burning of a piece of cotton at the time of its contact with fire. We admit the possibility of 
a contact between the two which will not result in burning, as also we admit the possibility of the 
transformation of cotton into ashes without coming into contact with fire. And they reject this 
possibility. 
There are three points from which the discussion of the question can be started 
Firstly, the opponent may claim that fire alone is the agent of burning, and that being an agent by 
nature (not by choice), it cannot refrain from doing what it is its nature to do — after it comes into 
contact with a subject which is receptive to it. 
This is what we deny. We say that it is God who — through the intermediacy of angels, or directly 
— is the agent of the creation of blackness in cotton; of the disintegration of its parts, and of their 
transformation into a smouldering heap or ashes. Fire, which is an inanimate thing, has no action. 
How can one prove that it is an agent? The only argument is from the observation of the fact of 
burning at the time of contact with fire. But observation only shows that one is with the other, not 
that it is by it and has no other cause than it.54 
 
 This is probably the most well-known statement by al-Ghazali in the Western 
world and is the one most often used to condemn him as totally irrational and as the 
                                                 
53 al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifa. 249. 
54 Ibid., 186. 
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villainous murderer of scientific inquiry within the Arab world.55  Reading the rest of the 
chapter, however, shows that al-Ghazali is using Aristotelian logic to reconcile the 
appearance that cause must always lead to effect with the Qur’an’s insistence on an 
omnipotent God; insisting that God abides by the rule of cause and effect implies a limit 
on God’s powers.  However, God’s interference in the apparent course of cause and  
effect is rare, so rare that instances of interference are deemed miracles. 
Now, if in extraordinary times, God breaks the Norm by causing such a thing to happen, then our 
cognitions (that a certain possible thing 'does not happen') will slip out of our hearts and will not 
be recreated by Him. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent us from believing that: 
(a) something may be possible, and may be one of those things to which God's power extends; 
(b) in spite of its being possible, it might have been known as a rule in the past that God would not 
do it; and 
(c) God may create for us a knowledge that He would not do it in this particular instance. 
So the philosophers' criticism is nothing but obstinate fault-finding.56 
 
Al-Ghazali’s theory of the true mechanics of the universe has a name in modern Western 
philosophy: occasionalism.  While the concept did originate with al-Ash‘ari and al-
Ghazali, it spread to Europe much as ibn Rushd’s works did, and it failed to stop its 
adherents from engaging in scientific inquiry. Notable proponents of this argument 
include Enlightenment philosophers Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715) and David 
Hume (1711-1776)—among enlightenment thinkers, these two were classified as both 
empiricists and skeptics.57  But ibn Rushd, beginning with his constant refrain of calling 
the argument “sophistry”, argues that denying cause and effect renders logic useless by 
                                                 
55 Ahmad, Jamil (September 1994), "Ibn Rushd", Monthly Renaissance 4 (9), retrieved 2008-10-14; That 
Medieval Islamic Culture was Inhospitable to Science" in Ronald L. Numbers (ed.): Galileo Goes to Jail 
and Other Myths About Science and Religion, Harvard University Press, 2009, esp. pp. 39-40 
56 al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifa, 190. 
57 William F. Vallicella, “God, Causation and Occasionalism,” Religious Studies 35, no. 1 (March 1, 1999): 
3–18. 
 23 
reciting the core tenets of Philosophical Skepticism, as established in the fourth century 
BCE: 58   
Logic implies the existence of causes and effects, and knowledge of these effects can only be 
rendered perfect through knowledge of their causes. Denial of cause implies the denial of 
knowledge, and denial of knowledge implies that nothing in this world can be really known, and 
that what is supposed to be known is nothing but opinion, that neither proof nor definition exist, 
and that the essential attributes which compose definitions are void. The man who denies the 
necessity of any item of knowledge must admit that even this, his own affirmation, is not 
necessary knowledge.59 
 
If ibn Rushd is at all aware that he is parroting Skeptic philosophy or of al-Ghazali’s 
associations with it, he gives no acknowledgement.  The bulk of his remaining response 
admits that if philosophers did apply these rules to miracles in the Qur’an, they would be 
considered heretical, but that this would never happen because philosophers do not apply 
the axioms of their knowledge to the Qur’an.   
Despite the above presentation which makes ibn Rushd’s argument appear rather 
weak, it is nonetheless a productive discussion for Islamic philosophers.  Herein we find 
two different models for the reconciliation of empirical investigations of burhan 
(observable and demonstrable phenomena) with the many unnatural occurrences 
described within the Abrahamic tradition.  Al-Ghazali chooses to insist on God’s 
omnipotence, with the caveat that God only rarely intervenes to contradict the usual 
natural laws, which we may continue to observe and analyze.  Ibn Rushd makes a 
somewhat simplified case for the separation of philosophy/science from theology as the 
only way for philosophers to avoid any chance of heresy. 
                                                 
58 Peter Klein, “Skepticism,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Autumn 2010 
Edition) (Palo Alto: Stanford University, 2011).  It particularly echoes a far less formal explanation given 
to me by my Philosophy Professor at Hamilton College: 
 “Since no one can observe or otherwise experience causation, the external world, or concepts like the 
meaning of life, justice, divinity, soul, etc., there’s no need to believe in such things. A Skeptic denies other 
philosophers’ claims that awareness of various competing dogmas regarding concepts was necessary, as 
people "ignorant" of the questions often live happier lives learning about them. Science does not require 
belief and faith in intelligible realities is different from pragmatic convention for the sake of experiment. 
Faced with a philosopher, Skeptics would immediately contradict any opinion they heard. Consensus 
indicates neither truth nor even probability. For example, the Earth is round, and it would remain so even if 
everyone believed it were flat. Unless, of course, it is flat, and we all simply believe it is round.” 
59 ibn Rushd, “Tahafut al-Tahafut,” sec. THE FIRST DISCUSSION: The denial of a logical necessity 
between cause and effect. 
 24 
Renan makes much ado about the fact that al-Ghazali’s book was very well 
received within the Muslim world while ibn Rushd’s had first a lukewarm reception, 
before being declared heresy several hundred years later.  But one reason for the poor 
reception of ibn Rushd’s book among Muslim intellectuals may be that ibn Rushd’s book 
is not a very powerful or convincing refutation al-Ghazali’s thoughts unless the reader is 
extremely well-versed not only in the writings of ibn Sina and Aristotle, but also in 
theories of existence that originated in Greece and were discussed by dozens of different 
Greek philosophers who arrived at different conclusions, such as monadism and atomism.  
Ibn Rushd’s most effective criticisms on al-Ghazali and ibn Sina have to do with their 
misunderstanding of Aristotle’s strange and non-intuitive middle position between 
monadism and atomism, hylomorphism.  Unfortunately, at no point in this book does ibn 
Rushd attempt to explain hylomorphism and how al-Ghazali and others misunderstand it 
Ibn Rushd, having edited Aristotle’s Physics, would have been extremely well-informed 
on the topic and felt that readers should either already have the same knowledge, or that 
by reading his critique, they would be inspired to find the same knowledge.  But I have 
intentionally left monadism, atomism, and hylomorphism unexplained so that the 
following paragraph may be read without the truly requisite background: 
The philosophers’ answer is that they assert that they have proved that the world is composed of 
five bodies: a body neither heavy nor light, i.e. the revolving spherical body of heaven and four 
other bodies, two of which are earth, absolutely heavy, which is the centre of the revolving 
spherical body, and fire, absolutely light, which is seated in the extremity of the revolving sphere; 
nearest to earth is water, which is heavy relatively to air, light relatively to earth; next to water 
comes air, which is light relatively to water, heavy relatively to fire. The reason why earth is 
absolutely heavy is that it is farthest away from the circular movement, and therefore it is the fixed 
centre of the revolving body; the reason why fire is absolutely light is that it is nearest to the 
revolving sphere; the intermediate bodies are both heavy and light, because they are in the middle 
between the two extremes, i.e. the farthest point and the nearest. If there were not a revolving 
body, surely there would be neither heavy nor light by nature, and neither high nor low by nature, 
and this whether absolutely or relatively; and the bodies would not differ by nature in the way in 
which, for instance, earth moves by nature to its specific place and fire moves by nature to another 
place, and equally so the intermediary bodies. And the world is only finite, because of the 
spherical body, and this because of the essential and natural finiteness of the spherical body, as 
one single plane circumscribes it.’ Rectilinear bodies are not essentially finite, as they allow of an 
increase and decrease; they are only finite because they are in the middle of a body that admits 
neither increase nor decrease, and is therefore essentially finite. And, therefore, the body 
circumscribing the world cannot but be spherical, as otherwise the bodies would either have to end 
in other bodies, and we should have an infinite regress, or they would end in empty space, and the 
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impossibility of both suppositions has been demonstrated. He who understands this knows that 
every possible world imaginable can only consist of these bodies, and that bodies have to be either 
circular-and then they are neither heavy nor light-or rectilinear-and then they are either heavy or 
light, i.e. either fire or earth or the intermediate bodies; that these bodies have to be either 
revolving, or surrounded by a revolving periphery, for each body either moves from, towards, or 
round the centre; that by the movements of the heavenly bodies to the right and to the left all 
bodies are constituted and all that is produced from opposites is generated; and that through these 
movements the individuals of these four bodies never cease being in a continual production and 
corruption. Indeed, if a single one of these movements should cease, the order and proportion of 
this universe would disappear, for it is clear that this order must necessarily depend on the actual 
number of these movements -- for if this were smaller or greater, either the order would be 
disturbed, or there would be another order – and that the number of these movements is as it is, 
either through its necessity for the existence of this sublunary world, or because it is the best . 
Do not ask here for a proof for all this, but if you are interested in science, look for its proof, 
where you can find it.60 
 
 If the reader is not already aware of hylomorphism, then ibn Rushd’s repeated 
statement throughout the entire text that al-Ghazali and the “theologians” do not 
understand what substance is, thus rendering their objections invalid, makes no particular 
sense and therefore has very little impact.  As he refers back to this misunderstanding in 
almost every other section of the book, it renders those arguments less convincing 
because they are based on a proof of a theory that may or may not make any particular 
sense to the reader, and without understanding the given information in an argument, it is 
impossible to understand the ultimate syllogism; without knowing what ibn Rushd 








                                                 
60 Ibid., sec. The First Discussion, The First Proof Concerning the eternity of the world.  Incidentally, 
though ibn Rushd implores readers to look for this proof, he does not tell them where they can find it. 
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Chapter Three: Ernst Renan  
It is difficult at times to repress the thought that history is about as instructive as an abattoir. 
      - Seanus Heany, Nobel Lecture, 1995 
 
In the main Continental/Arab Liberal dialogue about ibn Rushd (in which the 
dialectic between al-Jabari and Tarabichi takes place), it is a truth universally 
acknowledged that the narrative of how ibn Rushd inspired the Western Enlightenment 
while al-Ghazali effectively murdered scientific inquiry comes from the 19
th
 century 
thinker Ernst Renan, and in particular, is made clear in his book Averroes et 
l’Averroisme. Unfortunately, it has become such common knowledge that few authors 
provide any citation for this fact, and those that do, provide page numbers without 
specifying their edition.  What is worse for English-speakers interested in the debate is 
the fact that Averroes has never been translated into English.61  For future reference and 
the convenience of non-Francophone scholars of ibn Rushd, let it be known that Renan 
first formulated his accusation as such: 
It is above all against Ibn-Sina that Gazzali directed his Destruction of the Philosophers.  Gazzali 
is, indisputably, the most original mind of the Arab school. He has left us, in a curious book, his 
philosophical confessions, and the narrative of his voyage across the different systems of his time. 
No system having satisfied him, he concluded with skepticism; skepticism being unable to retain 
him, he rushed into asceticism, and called on the mystical dances of the Sufis for the euphoria of 
his thought. Having arrived there, he stops on death and annihilation. Those who, after having 
philosophized, embrace mysticism as their last resort, are usually the most intolerant enemies of 
philosophy. Gazzali, having become a Sufi, undertook to prove the radical powerlessness of 
reason, and, by a maneuver that has always seduced minds that are more impassioned than wise, to 
establish religion over skepticism. He deployed in this struggle a truly astonishing perspicacity of 
the mind. It is above all by the criticism of the principle of cause that he opened his attack against 
rationalism… We perceive nothing but simultaneity, never causality. The causality is nothing 
more than the will of God making it so that two things would usually follow each other.  The laws 
of nature don’t exist, or express no more than a habitual fact; God alone is immutable. It was, one 
sees, a negation of all science. Gazzali was one of those bizarre minds who embrace religion only 
as a way to taunt reason. Besides, unfavorable rumors were being spread about the honesty of his 
[Gazzali’s] feelings. Ibn-Roschd claims that he attacked philosophy to please the theologians, and 
to remove the suspicions that had arisen against his orthodoxy…  
                                                 
61 With only a vague knowledge of French and using the (unreliable) index of the Second Edition 
published in Paris in 1861 by Michel Levy Freres and available on Google Books, I was unable to find the 
exact place and phrasing of the original accusation. I was forced to resort to the much appreciated 
translation abilities of Lidiya Petrova, a friend with a B.A. in Romance Languages and Literatures. She 
found the original text (it appears on pages 96-99) and created a comprehensible English translation.   
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…Gazzali exercised a decisive influence over Arab philosophy. His attacks produced the ordinary 
effect of contradictions, and introduced into the opinion of his adversaries a thitherto unknown 
precision… Gazzali had humiliated science, and claimed that man only achieves perfection when 
he renounces the exercise of his rational faculties.62 
 
Not only does access to Renan’s original phrasing permit comparison to al-
Jabari’s account, but it also allows us to add nuance to Renan’s narrative.  Renan’s belief 
that “those who, after having philosophized, embrace mysticism as their last resort, are 
usually the most intolerant enemies of philosophy,” indicates that he actually blamed al-
Ghazali’s attacks on his Hellenic Skepticism and his Sufism, rather than on his 
Ash‘arism, as has often been assumed.  It also clarifies that, of all of al-Ghazali’s 
writings, Renan believes that al-Ghazali’s attack on cause and effect was the single most 
damaging attack ever made on Arab reason.  But the most curious phrase is Renan’s 
allegation that “Gazzali was one of those bizarre minds who embrace religion only as a 
way to taunt reason.”63  This implies not only a sort of pre-meditated malicious intent on 
al-Ghazali’s part to destroy reason/rationalism, but also paints al-Ghazali as a sort of 
psychotic trickster figure. 
Also of note is that Renan’s notorious opinion that most Semetic minds were 
entirely incapable of reason or Western rationalism, while found in abundance in the rest 
of the book, is absent in this passage.64  Indeed, al-Ghazali’s voyage of personal 
philosophy, which Renan (accurately) depicts at the beginning of this extract  is an 
accurate sketch of the progression of Western philosophy, which concluded with 
nihilism.  This is especially impressive given that nihilism had not yet been fully 
formulated in 1855.65  However, Renan’s argument does not take into account the 
evidence that, even when al-Ghazali adopted a nihilistic/skeptical worldview, he never 
once abandoned his belief in burhan  or empirical observation, the keystone of modern 
                                                 
62 Ernest Renan, Averroès et l’averroïsme: essai historique (Michel Lévy Frères, 1861), 96–99.  Original 
French text and Lidiya Petrova’s complete translation can be found in Appendix A. 
63 Originally "Gazzali fut un de esprits bizarres qui n'embrassent la religion que comme une manière de 
narguer la raison." 98. 
64 Wild, “Islamic Enlightenment and the Paradox of Averroes,” 384–385. 
65 Nietzsche was eleven at the time of this book’s publication and his full description of Nihilism would not 
be published until the 1880s. 
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science if not modern philosophy.  This omission drastically weakens Renan’s depiction 
of the death of al-Ghazali as the man who murdered the Arab Rationalism championed by 
ibn Rushd.  Nevertheless, Renan’s narrative has remained the basis of most Arab 










Chapter Four: The Contemporary Philosophers 
All true histories contain instruction; though, in some, the treasure may be hard to find, and when 
found, so trivial in quantity that the dry, shrivelled kernel scarcely compensates for the trouble of 
cracking the nut.           
       - Anne Brontë, Agnes Grey, 1847 
MOHAMMED ‘ABED AL-JABARI & GEORGE TARABICHI 
 Walid Harmaneh’s introduction to Arabic-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary 
Critique, while inaccurate (it is not the first of al- Jabari’s works to be translated into 
English: Jabari’s half of the UN Human Development in the Arab World: The Cultural 
and Societal Dimensions preceded it by three years66), remains correct in stating that al-
Jabari has been largely ignored by the English-speaking world despite his central position 
in Arab debates since the mid-1970s.67  With the exception of one translation of al-
Jabari’s works into German, it appears that al-Jabari and Tarabichi’s dialogue takes place 
almost exclusively in Arabic and French.68  Meanwhile, though George Tarabichi has 
reportedly translated more than two hundred books from French to Arabic while 
composing dozens of original works, he has only one publication available in English.69  
The lack of availability of al-Jabari’s and Tarabichi’s works in other languages is one of 
the reasons (along with its connection to the classical dispute) that the dialogue between 
these two scholars is the chief contemporary case study of this paper.  
This dialectic, these arguments and suggestions, are written by Arabs and 
intended for an Arab audience.  Unlike many of his fellows who studied for some time in 
the West, al-Jabari was educated in his native Morocco and taught in Damascus and 
several universities in Morocco; though he incorporated a great deal of European thought 
                                                 
66 Mu ammad   bid Jābir , United Nations, and United Nations Development Programme, Human 
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67 al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason, vii. 
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into his work, his instruction came largely through the filter of Arab instructors. Syrian-
born George Tarabichi received both his bachelor’s degree and his master’s from the 
University of Damascus (where he and al-Jabari were “colleagues, not friends,” 
according to his eulogy for al-Jabari)70  and worked in journalism with various Arab 
magazines and radio stations from the 1960s until he permanently moved to Paris after 
the Lebanese Civil War.71   Their dialogue is as close as I can come to examining the 
Arab intellectual perspective on ibn Rushd.72 Authenticity is a major issue when 
describing al-Jabari and Tarabishi’s works, because the question of ‘authenticity’ had 
been an obsession within the Arab world for much of their adult lives.73   
The conventional historical narrative  as painted in broad strokes by writers like 
Kassab and George Tarabichi74 is, that the Arabs’ humiliating defeat in the 1967 Six Day 
War caused a crisis in Arab intellectual and political thought, both in popular and 
intellectual circles, throughout much of the Arabic speaking world.75  This defeat forced 
Arabs to admit that neither the Arab world nor any individual Arab nation could be 
considered a true military power or a major competitor in global commerce.  The war 
marked the decisive failure only of Nasserism for Arabs in Egypt, many points East, but 
also of almost all other ideologies of modernization imported from Western/European 
society, not to mention any faith Arabs may have had in the reliability of Soviet 
manufactured weaponry.  Popular opinion, already suspicious of the West in the 
aftermath of colonialism, became hostile towards almost any idea that originated in 
                                                 
70 George Tarabishi, “Muhammad  ’Abed al-Jabari and Critical Thinking: A Quarter of a Century of 
Dialogue Without Dialogue,” Www.alawan.org, May 6, 2010, http://www.alawan.org/ -حوار-من-قرن-ربع 
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71 Abuzaid, “George Tarabishi - Arab Philosopher.” 
72 Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, “CV - Mohammed Abed al-Jabri” (http://www.aljabriabed.net, 2008), 
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73 Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab, Contemporary Arab Thought: Cultural Critique in Comparative Perspective, 
Kindle. (Columbia University Press, 2010), 65, 82, 133.  (Please note that the Kindle edition lacks page 
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74 Hasan Salman, “George Tarabishi: I Do Not Consider Myself a Philosopher and There Are No Arab 
Philosophers,” Asharq Al-awsat (Damascus, January 23, 2008), 
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Europe or the West (though this rejection did not include new technologies).  Liberal 
secularists scrambled to find and iterate any form of compelling ideology at all, 
especially following the death of Marxism as a reputable ideology in the 1980s.76  
Without any compelling competing ideologies available, Islamism spread throughout the 
entire Muslim world, causing the rise of theocratic regimes like Hezbollah and the 
persecution of non-Muslim Arabs.77   The efforts of the Islamists were aided by 
continuing economic stagnation that left a plurality of all Arabs unemployed since the 
1980s. This produced multiple generations of young men, many of whom lacked higher 
education, but did have an abundance of spare time and no way to gain independence or 
start their own families; in other words, an ideal recruiting pool for any quasi-military 
force that might attract their attentions.78 The growing threat of violent Islamism in turn 
gave rise to the current ‘Holy Grail’ for liberal Arab intellectuals: a historical and 
political narrative that attempts to make modern liberal ideals (e.g. human rights, 
democracy, pluralistic secularity, and uncensored intellectual and scientific inquiry) 
appear to be an organic outgrowth of Arab culture without being tainted by any Western 
influences.79  Both al-Jabari and Tarabichi would tender their own theories. 
The dominant narrative of the first waves of post-1967 Arab scholarship must 
take into account the shared experiences of the generation that wrote it: a tumultuous age 
marked by numerous shared cultural moments of disappointment and disillusionment. 
Although the experiences and responses no doubt differed somewhat in Morocco and in 
Syria, these can all be considered events in ‘Arab’ history of their generation. Al-Jabari 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 2   It should also be noted that both al-Jabari and Tarabichi have made unequivocal statements 
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was born in 1936 and Tarabichi in 1939, which meant that they experienced the failed 
aftermath of the experiments of the first Nahda.80 As young adults they witnessed the 
Algerian war for independence,  the birth of Nasserism, and documented the earliest 
stages of post-colonial literature, politics, and cultural reactions.  In their thirties, they 
cheered on Pan-Arabism and mostly straddled the fence in the Cold War.  They watched 
or listened in horror for six days in June 1967, and accepted the death of Nasserism.  
After that, they accepted the reality of auto-cratic regimes in Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Iraq, 
and Egypt, and the rise of a Muslim theocracy in Iran; they witnessed the collapse of 
Lebanon (supposedly one of the most successful post-colonial Arab states) into civil war, 
and bemoaned the continuing lack of economic development in almost all Arab nations.81  
In their old age, the much touted Iraqi army suffered a miserable defeat at the hands of a 
coalition led by the United States (twice), Palestinians engaged in two intifadahs, and 
Arabs who chose the Islamist alternative committed dozens of acts of terrorism that killed 
thousands.82  Al-Jabari did not live to see the Arab Spring, but in the discourse since then, 
his books have remained popular and a powerful influence.83  Tarabichi has grown more 
reclusive since 2010, but continues to publish and lecture. 
Examining the bibliographies and curricula vitae of both al-Jabari and Tarabichi 
is a dramatic illustration of the effect that the 1967 War had on Arab intellectuals.  Prior 
to the war, al-Jabari had been a primary and secondary school teacher and an active 
Marxist demonstrator; by 1970 he completed a doctorate in philosophy.  During the 
1970s he wrote books about the philosophy of science and math and gradually withdrew 
from the National Union Party.  Over the next few years he formulated the argument he 
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would advocate for the rest of his life and published the first volume of Naqd al-‘aql al-
‘arabi.  He presented his theory publicly for the first time at the Cairo Conference of 
1984 – “Heritage and the Challenges of the Age in the Arab Homeland: Authenticity and 
Contemporaneity,”84 – and  proceeded to elaborate on the theory in four more volumes.   
Tarabichi’s initial response was similar to al-Jabari’s; after a decade spent writing 
about Marxism, he seemed to abandon Marx completely and shifted his allegiance to 
Freud. He spendt the rest of the seventies and much of the eighties writing literary 
criticism using Freudian frameworks, culminating in his single English-language 
publication, a psychoanalytic critique of Nawal al-Saadawy’s fiction.  Then Tarabishi 
shifted course again, and began to psychoanalyze Arab intellectuals’ sudden obsession 
with their cultural heritage (turath). He diagnosed this phenomenon as a collective post-
traumatic reaction to the 1967 War, with Arabs as a culture retreating from the rest of the 
world and adopting a contrarian, self-obsessed attitude as a defense mechanism that 
would allow them to ignore the aftermath of their trauma. When forced to discuss the 
event they denied their own role in the disaster: it had been the fault of their ancestors, 
not theirs.85   
Tarabichi’s post-1967 diagnosis integrates neatly with the pre-existing dominant 
historical narrative in the Middle East. Since the advent of the so-called ‘modern period’ 
in the Middle East, marked by Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, Orientalists and 
Arab intellectuals have operated almost exclusively within the ‘decay’ or ‘decline’ theory 
of Middle Eastern history. This theory posits that the Islamic world experienced a golden 
age, in cultural, technological, intellectual, and artistic senses, that peaked at some point 
prior to the fifteenth century.  Following the rise of the Ottoman Empire, Arab-Islamic 
society entered a period not only of stagnation, but also of actual literary, artistic, and 
intellectual regression that lasted for the next four centuries while European society and 
culture surpassed them in every way.86  While in the last forty years many scholars have 
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challenged the “decay” narrative, it remains a dominant theory and since the last half of 
the nineteenth century, has provided a sort of “cultural inferiority complex” for the Arab 
world.87   
Tarabichi’s investigation into the Arab world’s complicated relationship with its 
own past culminates in his encyclopedic fifteen-year criticism of al-Jabari’s work. The 
first volume, Nazaria al-‘aql: naqd naqd al-‘aql al-arabi, was published in 1996, 
marking the beginning of a fourteen year passive-aggressive non-dialectic.  After a brief 
flurry of veiled insults and allegations in 1997 failed to draw al-Jabari into a direct 
response, Tarabichi’s interests shifted again.  Since 1998, all of Tarabichi’s books have 
focused on themes related to religion, secularism, and democracy (the thematic creep 
even trickles into some of his later critiques of al-Jabari).  By 2008, he declared that he is 
not a philosopher and he has no real philosophy, and he entered a period of relative 
seclusion.88     
“A QUARTER OF A CENTURY OF DIALOGUE WITHOUT DIALOGUE”89 
 
Returning to Tarabichi’s diagnosis of the Arab psyche, the reaction of a victim 
becoming obsessed with an idealized period before her traumatic experience (referred to 
as prisca theologia 90 when it occurs as a group phenomenon) is a common cultural 
response to periods of societal unrest and upheaval in any society.91  Most Western 
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of the Rose Cross; A Historical Perception, 1614–1620," Journal of Religion and Psychical Research, 
Volume 18, Number 3:141-48. 1995 for an Italian example  and James D. Heiser, Prisci Theologi and the 
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scientists choose to ignore that, in between running the Royal Mint and redefining the 
mathematical and physical laws of the universe as it was known, Sir Isaac Newton spent 
the bulk of his energy and time pursuing the Philosopher’s Stone and the Elixir of Life.92 
In the wake of 1967, many Arabs, secularists, socialists, Islamists, and other 
miscellaneous scholars, including al-Jabari, looked to an idealized past for answers.  A 
trained scholar of medieval philosophy (his dissertation subject was ibn-Khaldun), al-
Jabari looked at the modern problem and found a medieval solution.   
As is often the case, the diagnosis dictates the cure.  Al-Jabari believes that the 
reason that the Arab world cannot modernize organically, in a way that fits their culture 
and society so that it is a legitimate, authentic Arab Modernization, is that Arab culture 
for the last eight hundred years has been based on an epistemological theory that is 
incompatible with the greatest benefits of modernization, including the scientific method, 
human rights, and democracy. As stated in the introduction of this paper, al-Jabiri’s 
argument strongly resembles that of Ernst Renan, though al-Jabari rarely cites or even 
mentions Renan.93  The main difference is that, in al-Jabari’s iteration of the ‘Westerners 
are rational, Easterners are mystical’ theory, Arabs in Morocco and medieval al-Andalus 
are Western rather than Eastern.94  Al-Jabari believes that an epistemological system 
derived largely from Eastern sources which he refers to as ‘resigned reason’, renders 
Arab logic entirely formal and based on bayan (Qur’anic explication) and ‘irfan 
(illumination) rather than burhan (rational proof). This esoteric and irrational 
epistemology spread throughout the Arab world as a direct result of the rejection of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Hermetic Reformation in the Fifteenth Century, Repristination Press, 2011 for a later German-French 
revival. 
92 Chris Oxley, “Newton’s Dark Secrets,” Nova (Boston: PBS, 05 2005), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/physics/newton-dark-secrets.html. 
93 Exactly once, on page 290, and he quotes Meirhoff quoting Renan. 
94 al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason, 48.  The Amazigh are conspicuously absent throughout all four 
volumes of Naqd al-‘aql, but this is likely for the best. For an introduction to al-Jabari’s problematic 
history with the Amazigh and their language in particular, see Ibrahim Arzwal’s two part article published 
at alawan.com,  “Mohammad 'Abed al-Jabari and Critical Thinking: His Arabism is in fact his obstruction... 





logical Western Arab philosophers like ibn Rushd and ibn Khaldun and the acceptance of 
Eastern Arab Sufi mystics masquerading as philosophers like al-Ghazali, ibn Turmart, 
and (to a lesser degree) ibn-Sina. Al-Jabari provides his commentary on the al-
Ghazali/ibn Rushd dialectic and the Tahafuts in the final two chapters of Ta wīn Al-ʻaql 
Al-ʻArabī, the first volume of Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabi.95  Furthermore, this is the volume 
which Tarabichi does not address in the first volume of Naqd naqd al-‘aql al-‘arabi: 
Nazaria al-‘aql, enabling me to use his methods of critique on a separate section of al-
Jabari’s work.96  
 When Naqd al-‘aql al-‘arabi was first published in 1984, George Tarabichi 
(according to multiple interviews since) has stated that “At the time what I wrote about 
[the book] in an article for the magazine “al-Wahida [Unity]”, was that this book not 
only educates you, but it also changes you.  From then on, you cannot return to reading 
the way that you read before reading [this book].”97  But upon rereading it, he soon began 
to notice major problems with the book: from his concerns with the underlying ideologies 
to a few irregularities he had noticed in the quotations.98  In his eulogy for al-Jabari, 
Tarabichi said that, soon after the article was published, he invited al-Jabari to his Paris 
home and they met for the first time since they had been students together at Damascus.  
After dinner they drank whiskey together while Tarabichi explained every problem he 
had with the examples al-Jabari had used in the book.  When al-Jabari failed to respond 
                                                 
95 It also built on the work he began in   a nu Wa-Al-Turāth., particularly chapters 3 and 9.  Further, 
Takw n happens to be the only volume of Naqd that has been translated into English.  Though I did read the 
Arab original two years ago, I have opted for time’s sake and for consistency (I read both Tahafuts in 
English as well and it was simpler to recognize arguments when the terms were in the same language.)  
Furthermore,  
96 Jūrj  arāb sh ,  a arīyat Al-ʻaql:  aqd  aqd Al-ʻaql Al-ʻArabī, al- ab ah 1. (Bayrūt: Dār al-Sāq , 
1996), 9. 
97 Salman, “George Tarabishi: I Do Not Consider Myself a Philosopher and There Are No Arab 
Philosophers.”  Translation my own: originally ( أنه ليس كتابا « الوحدة»وقد كتبت عنه في حينه في مجلة 
 (يثقف بل هو أيضا كتاب يغيّر، فمن يقرأه ال يعود بعد قراءته كما كان قبل قراءته
98  arāb sh ,  a arīyat Al-ʻaql, 12. 
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to the criticism, they cut off all academic and personal friendships. Tarabichi claims this 
was one of the great to disappointments of his life.99   
After Tarabichi published the first volume of his critique, al-Jabari gave an 
interview to the Moroccan socialist paper, al-Itihaad al-Ishtiraki, in February of 1997 in 
which he responded to Tarabichi but refused to name him.  “Until now, I am fully assured 
that everything I wrote does not include any scientific, epistemological or methodological 
errors. In this regard, I am fully satisfied with what I have written.”100  Unfortunately, the 
full text of the interview is unavailable to me, because Chalala quotes other statements 
that make al-Jabari’s response appear possibly delusional and paranoid.  He makes 
accusations about conspiracies against him and his work by groups consisting of  
Muslims, non-Muslims, people whom he will not name because it “will reveal their 
religious affiliation” as well as “…Leftists and Communists [who] gathered during a 
symposium in Tunisia. There they held a separate meeting and concluded that [al-
Jabberi's] epistemological writings are dangerous and threaten Marxist and progressive 
thought.”101  A few writers, including Hazem Saghieh, attempted to arrange for a direct 
confrontation, but the controversy sputtered out quickly as al-Jabari refused to address 
Tarabichi directly, and Tarabichi insisted that his work spoke for itself.102  Tarabichi’s 
eulogy for al-Jabari received general acclaim for putting an amicable end to the 
enmity.103  Nonetheless, Tarabichi continues to lecture on the faults in al-Jabari’s work to 
this day.104 
                                                 
99 Tarabishi, “Muhammad  ’Abed al-Jabari and Critical Thinking: A Quarter of a Century of Dialogue 
Without Dialogue.” 
100 Chalala, “Elie Chalala Reports on the Tarabishi -- al-Jabberi Debate.” 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibrahim al-Ariss, “George Tarabishi on His Book, Al Jabberi, and Theory of Rethinking Turath Studies 
| Al Jadid Magazine,” Al Jadid Magazine, 1997, http://www.aljadid.com/content/george-tarabishi-his-book-
al-jabberi-and-theory-rethinking-turath-studies. 
103 Khaled al-Harb, “ جورج طرابيشي مقدراً عابد الجابري: مثقف المروءة: مغرس  ,” News Aggregator, The 
Maghress, June 13, 2010, http://www.maghress.com/marayapress/3385. 
104  ’Ahmad Al-Sheedi, “ جورج طرابيشي يشن هجوما عنيفا على محمد عابد الجابري ويتهمه بخيانة مصادره
 George Tarabishi Makes Strong Argument Against Mohammed  ’Abed al-Jabari  and Accuses Him) التراثية
of Betraying His Traditional Sources),” News, Oman Daily, March 25, 2012, 
http://main.omandaily.om/node/89427. 
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In Nazaria al-‘aql, Tarabichi sets out the basic premises of his entire critique:  
 
1. Al-Jabari’s argument ignores all of the philosophical and scientific 
changes that have occurred between ibn-Rushd’s death and the twentieth 
century.   
2. Al-Jabari refers to Greek philosophers and philosophies that he does not 
understand correctly, resulting in arguments based on those philosophies 
that are completely mistaken.105   
3. The content of  al-Jabari’s bibliography is suspect (including failing to 
credit earlier theorists like Renan and Lalande).106    
4. His citations are questionable (to the point where Tarabichi questions 
whether or not al-Jabari fabricated evidence), and his use of quotations is 
misleading.107   
5. Furthermore, al-Jabari’s central premise is fanatically adherent to what 
Tarabichi calls Western [or possibly in this context, Moroccan] rationality 
and bigoted against Eastern reason, and for the Sunni statements against 
the knowledge of the Shi'i, and for political Islam against spiritual 
Islam.108 
 
As Nazariya al-‘aql focuses largely on the contents of the third volume of Naqd 
al-‘aql, the rest of this paper applies Tarabichi’s critique to the final two chapters of 
Ta wīn al-‘aql.  Even within that excerpt, Tarabichi’s critique appears to be quite 
accurate. 
Tarabichi’s claim that al-Jabari was inherently biased towards Western 
rationalism is seen in the names of the chapters of Ta wīn. Al-Jabari, though described by 
von Kugelgen as a Marxist, had resigned from the National Union party in 1981, and by 
the time he began Naqd al-‘aql, he had become a Moroccan nationalist, and his critique 
of the Tahafut reflects that.109  He introduces al-Ghazali in a chapter titled, “The Crisis of 
Fundamentals and the Fundamentals of Crisis”, while the chapter titled “A New 
                                                 
105  arāb sh ,  a arīyat Al-ʻaql, 116–118. 
106 Jūrj  arāb sh ,  a arīyat Al-ʻaql:  aqd Naqd Al-ʻaql Al-ʻArabī, al- ab ah 1. (Bayrūt: Dār al-Sāq , 
1996), 13–15. 
107 Ibid., 25–28. 
108 Ibid., 8–9. 
 ar b sh ,  a a īya   l-ʻaql, 8–9. 
109 Anke von Kügelgen/ آنكى ڤون كوغيلغين, “A Call for Rationalism,” 113; al-Jabri, “CV - Mohammed 
Abed al-Jabri,” 2. 
 39 
Beginning… However!” focuses exclusively on philosophers from al-Maghreb and al-
Andalus.110  
Al-Ghazali, an Easterner and worse, a Sufi mystic, suffers from some of the al-
Jabari’s harshest criticisms, many of which appear to be based on selective use of 
sources, manipulation of quotations, and a complete misreading of the Stoics and 
Skeptics.  Al-Jabari first provides a brief biography of al-Ghazali in which he emphasizes 
al-Ghazali’s nervous breakdown by titling it “Walking out of Baghdad: al-Ghazali’s 
Crisis.”111  He also accuses al-Ghazali of being one of the main sources of ‘resigned 
reason’ because of the widespread availability of his works.112  Two earlier chapters 
described ‘resigned reason,’ which appears at least to be an original concept of al-
Jabari’s, but one he seems hesitant to define.  The clearest definition I could find appears 
in chapter eight: 
 
Yet, including [Manicheism, Hermetism, and Neo-Platonism] as part of what we have termed the 
'irrational of the reason' is justified, as they all confirm the inability of human reason to achieve 
awareness of God through contemplation of the universe, which implies that human awareness 
ought to occur through direct contact/communion with the absolute truth: Allah (God). It is the 
'resigned reason' (al-‘aql al-mustaqil).[which we will locate in] Arabic-Islamic culture and 
recogniz[e] forms of its presence there.113 
 
When reading this definition, it also must be noted that  al-Jabari uses “Hermetism” in a 
broad sense that also includes the Greek schools of Stoicism,114 and Skepticism.115 As an 
example of al-Jabari’s failure to understand Greek philosophy, he includes the Stoics and 
the Skeptics among the great enemies of reason and rationalism despite the fact that their 
epistemology was based on experimentation and empirical evidence, i.e. the burhan he 
otherwise rhapsodizes about.116  Al-Jabari also neglects to mention that al-Ghazali 
                                                 
110 al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason, 365. 
111 Ibid., 348. 
112 Ibid. 234, 360,  403-405, 407. 
113 al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason, 192.   
114 Ibid, 234. 
115 Ibid, 204, 419. 
116 Brad Inwood and Donald M. Borchert, “Stoicism,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Detroit: Macmillan 
Reference USA, 206AD); Klein, “Skepticism”; Alvin Reines, “Skeptics and Skepticism,” ed. Michael 
Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik, Encyclopaedia Judaica. (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 207AD). 
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identified himself as a Skeptic for two years during his biography, which would 
otherwise be an error by omission. 
His critique of Tahafut takes up the bulk of the remainder of the chapter.  
However, before he addresses the contents of the book al-Jabari inserts a lengthy tangent 
questioning al-Ghazali’s motives for writing Tahafut at all. He begins that tangent by 
writing a branching tangent questioning what al-Ghazali meant when he said that logic 
was necessary.  Al-Jabari first defines al-Ghazali’s concept of ‘logic’ by allowing that al-
Ghazali felt that logic was needed to respond to philosophy (a statement on which he 
does not further elaborate).  He then provides evidence that al-Ghazali felt that logic was 
necessary for jurists and theologians to reconcile their decisions.  However, in order to 
show this, al-Jabari mixes brief quotes from a number of al-Ghazali’s early texts 
including Jawahir al-Quran, Miyar al-‘ilm, and Mafassil al-Khilaf, and alternates 
between quotations and his own statements without clear boundaries.117  He concludes 
the paragraph by stating, “Obviously, then, what al-Ghazali desired by logic was 'debate' 
(al-jadal) and not 'demonstration by inferential evidence' (al-burhan).118 This contradicts 
one of the quotes he took from al-Ghazali in the same paragraph. “And logic is also 
necessary for fiqh because 'discernment/speculation’ [on the basis of evidence] - al-
naza119 - is not in contradiction with al-nazar120 in matters of reason'...:”.121  It also 
                                                 
117 al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason, 351–352. 
118 Ibid., 352. 
119 This is one of two  Arabic words that isn’t followed by a translation on this page.  (See note 95 for the 
reason I cannot find the original Arabic word myself) I cannot make sense of it: the root is definitely ز -ز-ن 
not   ع-ز-ن or   ى-ز-ن  –while my transcription does not contain them, the text always uses diacritic marks 
and the symbol ʿ to indicate an ‘ayn and  ’ to indicate aleph.  I have consulted  Lane’s (classical), and 
Wehr’s dictionaries and even Google translate.  The root  ز-ز-ن  relates to a number of things: seeping, 
vibrating, swiftness, fickleness, (sensuous) passion, lust (the meaning of  نزة to Wehr and Lane), 
perambulating, and tramps (in the vagabond sense, not the lusty female sense).  None of them make any 
sense to me in context. 
120 Pettiness.   
121 Emphasis mine.  Also note that the beginning of my quotation (And logic is also necessary) is al-
Jabari’s voice; al-Ghazali’s quote starts with ‘discernment’.  As to the quote itself, al-Jabari cites the 1961 
edition published by Sulayman Dunya. (footnote 64, page 363)  I have access to the 1965 edition of the 
book by S. Dunya  and printed by the same Cairene publisher.I would gladly have pulled the original quote, 
except al-Jabari provides no page number in this citation.  He cites the book twice more, but only one has a 
quotation (66) and  the quote isn’t even an entire clause (‘the text [of the Qur’an], the sunnah, and the 
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contradicts al-Ghazali’s and ibn Rushd’s own writings regarding al-Ghazali’s opinion of 
burhan, as noted above on pages 12 and 17. 
Carrying over onto the next page, al-Jabari’s imposed definition of logic as 
‘debate’  is combined with the fact that al-Ghazali wrote a clear explanation of how to 
compose syllogisms when acting as a judge to come to a possibly even more precarious 
conclusion: 
In other words, logic for al-Ghazali is 'debate' according to the terminology of Aristotle, namely 
'inductive reasoning positively or negatively in one same issue, avoiding falling into contradiction, 
and defending the positive and negative result.  This is precisely what interested al-Ghazali in 
logic, and thus, he did not tend towards the production of knowledge, but to defend one kind give 
of it to destroy the other.”122 
 
However, al-Jabari’s labyrinth of oblique conclusions is almost forgotten when al-Jabari 
asserts (without citation) later on this page that there was no need for al-Ghazali to rebut 
the philosophers because, “There were no philosophers in [al-Ghazali’s] time at all.”123  
‘Umar Khayyam (1048-1131), who was born and lived in al-Ghazali’s native Khurasan 
ten years before al-Ghazali, who taught and wrote at least seven books in Arabic about 
ibn-Sina’s philosophy, and who outlived al-Ghazali by twenty years, apparently does not 
count.124  As al-Jabari has a doctorate in philosophy and counts himself as an expert on 
Arab-Islamic culture, this statement is unmistakably an error by omission.   
Finally, he concludes that, as al-Ghazali had no rational reasons to write Tahafut, 
it must have been written for one of two reasons.  The first is that al-Ghazali felt the need 
to defend Ash‘arite doctrine, which is an interesting argument given that within Tahafut, 
al-Ghazali rebuts philosophical statements with verses from the Qur’an alone (which 
would make it a defense of the Qur’an itself, not merely the Ash‘arite interpretation). 125 
                                                                                                                                                 
consensus’), while the  other (67) is from a different chapter where al-Jabari explains how to build a 
syllogism. 
122 al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason, 352–353.  Emphasis his. 
123 Ibid., 353. Emphasis his. 
124 Mehdi Aminrazavi and Glen Van Brummelen, “Umar Khayyam,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2011., 2011, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/umar-
khayyam/. 
125 al-Ghazali, Tahafut al-Falasifa, 190. 
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The other explanation al-Jabari provides  is that Tahafut may have been an early 
manifestation of al-Ghazali’s nervous breakdown, written as a paranoid reaction to the 
assassination of Nizam al-Mulk. Al-Jabari writes, “Consequently, could this assassination 
and the subsequent terror and turmoil in the Seljuq state and among its men, of whom al-
Ghazali was one, have been what he termed the 'difficulties' which had stimulated him to 
compose The Incoherence of Philosophers?” further impugning al-Ghazali’s mental state 
and reliability as an intellectual while composing this work.126 Thus, in a mere five pages 
of The Fundamentals of Arab Logic, al-Jabari commits four of the five major errors that 
Tarabichi enumerated, several of them repeatedly.  
 As cataloguing every instance of these errors would truly be an encyclopedic 
project (and I now have an even greater appreciation of the fact that it only took 
Tarabichi fifteen years to complete his critique), I shall confine the rest of my 
examination to only the most egregious errors in the pages regarding ibn-Rushd.  Al-
Jabari’s idealized vision of ibn Rushd’s Andalus includes a mass persecution of the 
Malikis and public burning of their works during the reign of Ya‘qub al-Mansur.127 Al-
Jabari cites ʿAbd al-Wā id al-Marrākush , al-Muʿjib fī tal hīs a hbār al-Maghrib.  
However, he Encyclopedia of Islam articles on Ya‘qub al-Mansur in both the Second and 
Third editions mention the Caliph’s relative tolerance of the Malikis as compared to that 
of his father and that he often surrounded himself with religious advisors both Almohad 
and Maliki.128  More importantly, the Third edition article also cites ʿAbd al-Wā id al-
Marrākush , al-Muʿjib fī tal hīs a hbār al-Maghrib.  If there had been widespread 
persecution of the Malikis mentioned in that text, it seems doubtful that Mr. Fromherz 
would fail to include it when he also mentioned that the largest internal threat that al-
                                                 
126 al-Jabri, The Formation of Arab Reason, 354. 
127 Ibid., 395. 
128 Miranda A. Huici, “Abū Yūsuf Yaʿḳūbb. Yūsuf B. ʿAbd al-Muʾmin al-Manṣūr,” ed. P. Bearman et al., 
Encyclopedia of Islam (Brill Onlinr, 2012); Allen J. Fromherz, “Abū Yaʿqūb Yūsuf al-Manṣūr,” ed. 
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Mansur faced, the Banū Ghāniya, were Malikis, and that al-Mansur banished ibn-Rushd 
in an attempt to appeal to the Malikis.129 
 Continuing on, al-Jabari devotes not quite an entire page to Tahafut al-Tahafut, 
mostly quoting portions of Tahafut where ibn Rushd chastises al-Ghazali directly, and 
adds very little independent commentary130  Then he states that ibn Rushd attempted to 
excuse al-Ghazali by placing the blame on ibn Sina using a number of quotes from al-
Kashf 'an manahij al-'adla fi 'aqaid al-mil, which seems to contradict his earlier 
argument that the Avicennan tradition helped keep Persian culture vibrant much longer 
than Arab culture.131   For reasons unclear to me, al-Jabari chooses to focus on the portion 
of the dialectic between al-Ghazali and ibn Rushd which took place in Fasl al-Maqal.  He 
notes that the text is a response to al-Ghazali about how using logic is a legal duty, but 
fails to note that it is a text wherein ibn Rushd explains the many ways that he agrees 
with al-Ghazali, particularly in regards to burhan.132 The entire section (a mere two 
pages) is highly confused and al-Jabari quickly concludes the section and moves on to 
describe how ‘resigned reason,’ Sufi mysticism, and orthodox ‘ulama killed all sense of 
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We constitute a narrative species, we humans. We like to tell one another that 
we’re a rational species, but given human behavior in places such as Cambodia, 
that idea has become more of a bitter joke.  A narrative species is something else, 
and closer to the mark. We learn by stories, live by stories, evolve by telling the 
story of ourselves in the half-vain, half-beautiful hope that one day we may get 
our story right.          
-Roger Rosenblatt eulogizing Spalding Gray, Swimming to Cambodia, 2005 
 
Since the theory of ibn Rushd being the ideal role model and mascot for Arab 
rationalism and modernization was proposed in the mid-nineteenth century by Ernst 
Renan, a notoriously racist Orientalist, the idea has permeated Arab liberal thought.  This 
occurred in spite of the fact that, if al-Ghazali and ibn Rushd are read together and in 
context, they largely agree on the issues most relevant to how Renan defined both 
rationalism and modernization.  They both supported scientific empiricism, 
experimentation, and intellectual curiosity; they both defended the rules of formal logic; 
and they both even supported early formulations of the concept of the separation of 
church and state.  The topics about which they disagreed – the eternity of the universe, 
the nature of existence, whether or not there will be a true bodily resurrection at the Day 
of Judgment—are things about which scientists, philosophers, and theologians continue 
to disagree to this very day.  As mentioned in the introduction, ibn Rushd and al-Ghazali 
are still used as model references in contemporary Western philosophical debates. 
Meanwhile, in the Middle East, ibn Rushd has been trotted out by scholar after 
scholar as the key to modernization: Farah Antun, Salama Musa, Mahmud Qasim, and 
Muhammad ‘Ammara, just to name a few.  Famed Egyptian director Yusuf Chahine even 
made a Bollywood-esque major motion picture, La Destin (1997), supposedly a 
biography of ibn Rushd (it took a number of ‘artistic liberties’ with some facts) and 
idolized ibn Rusdh so much that he admitted in interviews that ibn Rushd was an 
 45 
analogue for his own, poor, persecuted self.133  But as of yet, the Averroiest or Rushdiyya 
movement has failed to produce any appreciable results. 
If there is anything to learn from the dialectic between al-Jabari and Tarabichi, it 
is that this theory has not only been exhaustively explored, but has also been exhaustively 
debunked.  Two of the finest Arab minds of their generation spent a quarter of a century 
exploring this topic from every possible angle.  They produced a remarkable record of 
how idolization of ibn Rushd (or really, any figure from the idealized Classical period) 
would not lead the Middle East into a true Nahda, but they did not produce any theory of 
how the Middle East actually could achieve an age in which intellectual, artistic, and 
scientific endeavors flower.  Al-Jabari spent twenty years on his project; Tarabichi spent 
fifteen years on his.  What else could they have been researching during all that time? 
Prisca theologia is a common cultural response to periods of turmoil and unrest, 
but it being a common response does not mean that it is an effective response.  Earlier I 
stated that the diagnosis of a problem is what dictates the cure.  Using the method of 
differential diagnosis, I believe that this paper has established that rejecting ibn Rushd 
and embracing al-Ghazali did not cause Arab culture’s current problem.  The time has 
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Appendix A 
RENAN’S ORGINAL TEXT134  
… Ces favoris de Dieu sont les prophètes. En général, Ibn-Sina parait philosopher 
avec une  certaine sobriété.  Ibn-Roschd lui  reproche amèrement de ne pas savoir-
prendre un parti, et de tenir toujours le milieu entre les théologiens  el les philosophes. Il 
admet que la  personnalité  humaine se conserve après la mort, et il cherche à s'arrêter sur 
la voie du panthéisme, en mettant le monde dans la catégorie du possible. Cette 
distinction du possible et du nécessaire est le fond de la théorie d'Ibn-Sina, et la base sur 
laquelle il cherche à établir la personnalité divine. Ibn-Roschd ajoute toutefois que, 
suivant d'autres, Ibn-Sina n'admettait l'existence d'aucune substance séparée, el que sa 
vraie opinion sur Dieu et l'éternité du monde devait être cherchée dans la Philosophie 
orientale, où il identifiait Dieu avec l'univers.  
C'est surtout contre Ibn-Sina que Gazzali dirigea sa Destruction des philosophes. 
Gazzali est, sans contredit, l'esprit le plus original de l'école arabe'. Il nous a laissé, dans 
un curieux livre, ses conCessions philosophiques, et le récit de son voyage à travers les 
différents systèmes de son temps. Aucun système ne l'ayant satisfait, il conclut au 
scepticisme; le scepticisme n'ayant pu le  retenir, il se precipite dans l'ascèse, et demande 
aux danses mystiques des soufls l'étourdisllement de sa pensée. Arrivé là, il s'arrête dans 
la mort et l'anéantissement.  Ceux qui, après avoir philosophé, embrassent le  mysticisme 
en désespoir de cause, sont d'ordinaire les ennemis les plus intolérants de la philosophie. 
Gazzali, devenu souft, entreprit de prouver l'impuissance radicale de la raison, et, par une 
manœuvre qui a toujours séduit les esprits plus ardents que sages,  de fonder la  religion 
sur le scepticisme. Il déploya dans cette lutte  une perspicacité d'esprit vraiment 
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étonnante. C'est surtout par la critique du principe de cause qu'il ouvrit  son  attaque  
contre  le rationalisme. Hume n'a rien dit de plus. Nous ne percevons que la simultanéité, 
jamais la causalité. La causalité n'est autre chose que la volonté de Dieu faisant que deux 
choses se suivent ordinairement. Les lois de la nature n'existent pas, ou n'expriment qu'un 
fait habituel; Dieu seul est immuable. C'était, on le voit, la  négation de toute science. 
Gazzali fut un de ces esprits bizarres qui n'embrassent la religion que comme une manière 
de narguer la  raison. Des bruits défavorables coururent, du reste, sur  lé  droiture de ses 
sentiments. Ibn·Roschd  prétend qu'il attaqua la philosophie pour complaire aux 
théologiens, et écarter les soupçons qui s'étaient élevés contre son orthodoxie. Moïse de 
Nàrbonne nous apprend  qu'il  avait composé pour ses amis un petit écrit secret où il 
donnait ia solution des objections qu'il avait présentées au public comme insolubles; cet 
écrit s'est en effet retrouvé en hébreu à la Bibliothèque de Leyde. Ibn·Tofaïl relève ses 
perpétuelles contradictions, et prouve avec évidence qu'il avait composé des ouvrages 
ésotériques, où il professait des doctrines fort différentes de celles qu'il jetaitau vulgaire.  
<< Accepte ce que tu vois, disait·il, et laisse là ce que tu as entendu; lorsque le soleil se 
lève, il te dispense de contempler Saturne.>>  
Gazzali exerça une influence décisive sur la philosophie arabe. Ses attaques 
produisirent l'effet ordinaire des contradictions, et introduisirent dans  l'opinion  des  
adversaires une précision jusque-là  inconnue.  Ibn-Bâdja (Avempace) fut le premier qui 
s'efforça de réhabiliter contre lui l'autorité de la raison. Gazzali avait humililé la science, 
et prétendu que l'homme n'arrive à la perfection qu'en renonçant à l'exercice  de ses 
facultés  rationnelles. Ibn·Bâdja, dans son célèbre traité du Régime du solitaire, esaaya de 
prouver que c'est par la science et le développement successif de ses facultés que 
l'homme arrive à s'identifier avec l'intellect actif. Il joignait à cette théorie psychologique 
une théorie  politique, une sorte d'utopie ou de modèle idéal de société où l'homme 
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arriverait sans effort à l'identification. Le triomphe de l'âme rationnelle sur la partie 
animale est le but des efforts de la vie morale. L'acte de à l'intelligences'opère parles 
formes intelligibles qui arrivent à l'intellect matériel ou passif; là, elles reçoivent de 
l'intellect actif la forme et la réalité. Quand l'homme, par l'étude et la spéculation, est 
arrivé à la pleine possession de sa conscience, alors c'est l'intellect acquis; le cercle de 
l'évolution humaine est achevé, et l'homme n'a plus qu'à mourir. 
LIDIYA PETROVA’S ENGLISH TRANSLATION 
Those favored by God are the prophets. In general, Ibn-Sina appeared to 
philosophize with a certain sobriety. Ibn-Roschd criticizes him bitterly for not knowing 
how to make a choice, and for always holding the middle ground between the theologians 
and the philosophers. He admitted that the human personality is preserved after death, 
and he seeks to stop himself at the path of pantheism, in putting the world into the 
category of the possible. This distinction of the possible and the necessary is the seat of 
Ibn-Sina’s theory, and the foundation on which he seeks to establish a divine 
figurehead/personality. Ibn-Roschd adds however that, according to others, Ibn-Sina 
didn’t admit the existence of any separate substance, and that his true opinion about God 
and the eternity of the world should have been sought in the Oriental Philosophy, or he 
identified God with the universe. 
It is above all against Ibn-Sina that Gazzali directed his Destruction of the 
Philosophers.  Gazzali is, indisputably, the most original mind of the Arab school. He has 
left us, in a curious book, his philosophical confessions, and the narrative of his voyage 
across the different systems of his time. No system having satisfied him, he concluded 
with skepticism; skepticism being unable to retain him, he rushed into asceticism, and 
called on the mystical dances of the Sufis for the euphoria of his thought. Having arrived 
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there, he stops on death and annihilation. Those who, after having philosophized, 
embrace mysticism as their last resort, are usually the most intolerant enemies of 
philosophy. Gazzali, having become a Sufi, undertook to prove the radical powerlessness 
of reason, and, by a maneuver that has always seduced minds that are more impassioned 
than wise, to establish religion over skepticism. He deployed in this struggle a truly 
astonishing perspicacity of the mind. It is above all by the criticism of the principle of 
cause that he opened his attack against rationalism. Hume has said nothing more. We 
perceive nothing but simultaneity, never causality. The causality is nothing more than the 
will of God making it so that two things would usually follow each other.  The laws of 
nature don’t exist, or express no more than a habitual fact; God alone is immutable. It 
was, one sees, a negation of all science. Gazzali was one of those bizarre minds who 
embrace religion only as a way to taunt reason. Besides, unfavorable rumors were being 
spread about the honesty of his [Gazzali’s] feelings. Ibn-Roschd claims that he attacked 
philosophy to please the theologians, and to remove the suspicions that had arisen against 
his orthodoxy. Moise de Narbonne tells us that he had created for his friends a small 
secret piece of writing/document where he gave the resolution of the objections that he 
had presented to the public as insolvable; this document has in fact been found in Hebrew 
in the Leyde Library. Ibn-Tofail picks up his perpetual contradictions, and proves with 
evidence that he had put together from esoteric works, where he [Gazzali] professed 
doctrines widely differing from those that he threw to the wind. “Accept what you see, he 
said, and leave there that which you have understood; when the sun rises, it excuses you 
from contemplating Saturn.” 
Gazzali exercised a decisive influence over Arab philosophy. His attacks 
produced the ordinary effect of contradictions, and introduced into the opinion of his 
adversaries a thitherto unknown precision. Ibn-Badja (Avempace) was the first who 
 50 
strove to rehabilitate against him [Gazzali] the authority of reason. Gazzali had 
humiliated science, and claimed that man only achieves perfection when he renounces the 
exercise of his rational faculties. Ibn-Badja, in his celebrated treatise of The Regimen of 
the Hermit, tried to prove that it is by science and the successive development of his 
faculties that man comes to identify himself with active intellect. He attached to this 
psychological theory a political theory, a sort of utopia or of an ideal model of society 
where man came without effort to the identification. The triumph of the rational 
soul/spirit over the animal part is the goal of the efforts of the moral life. The act of 
intelligence is produced by the intelligible forms that come to a material or passive 
intellect; there, they receive from the active intellect a form and a reality. When man, for 
study and speculation, comes to a full possession of his awareness, then it is the acquired 
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